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The relative calm on the markets during the 
month of August offered everyone a much-
needed pause to recover and reflect. Instrumental 
in placating the situation – maybe not 
permanently, but in any case with some enduring 
effect – were in my view two important factors. 
These were, firstly, the achievements of the Euro 
Area Summit of 29 June that have provided a 
clearer sense of the direction Europe needs to 
take, and as a result of which we now have 
concrete proposals on a Banking Union on the 
table. Secondly, the ECB's decisive 
announcements over the course of the summer 
and its introduction of Outright Market 
Transactions (OMTs) have left no doubt 
concerning the integrity and viability of the euro 
area.  
The June European Council called for a specific 
and time-bound roadmap towards a genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union. This is to 
include proposals on four essential types of 
union that Europe must move towards, 
consisting of integrated frameworks in the 
financial, budgetary, economic, and political 
sphere. The lack of cohesion along these four 
fronts in the EU, and especially in the euro area, 
is the main cause of the deep challenges we have 
been facing for the past three years, be they in 
terms of public finances, macroeconomic 
imbalances, or banking sector worries.  
Monetary policy action by the ECB has 
complemented the overarching efforts to create a 
more robust Economic and Monetary Union. 
Through its OMT facility, the ECB has acted to 
quell the severe disruptions in some Member 
States' sovereign bond markets that have 
impaired monetary policy transmission in the 
euro area. The OMT facility will be 
implemented with strict and effective 
conditionality under an appropriate EFSF/ESM 
programme. It will counteract unwarranted rises 
in sovereign bond yields through targeted 
sovereign bond purchases in the secondary 
market. The programme was devised in 
recognition of the fragile balance between 
allowing justified market signals to the greatest 
possible extent, while avoiding disruptions 
stemming from irrational panic. Problems in 
maintaining this balance have dogged the 
resolution of the crisis from the outset. It has 
become overwhelmingly clear that swings in 
investor confidence and in wider economic 
sentiment can in themselves lead to profound 
turmoil and to the existence of multiple 
equilibria for any given set of economic 
fundamentals. The role of modern economic 
policy must be to steer the economy towards 
benign equilibria. 
At the June euro area summit it was decided that 
once an effective single supervisory mechanism 
involving the ECB was established, the ESM 
could, following a regular decision, have the 
possibility to recapitalize banks in the euro area 
directly. The Commission unveiled its proposals 
for a single supervisory mechanism for the 
banking sector on September 12. The proposals 
are for the ECB to begin overseeing euro area 
banks from 2013 onwards, first those that have 
received or requested bailouts, then extending 
supervision to all 6000 euro area banks. This 
addresses the long-standing vulnerability that 
banking supervision has remained national 
amidst rapid cross-border expansion of banking 
activities. A comprehensive and consistent 
system of supervision is essential for detecting 
and addressing vulnerabilities of individual 
banks, and also at a systemic level. It is a crucial 
and significant first step towards a banking 
union that also calls for a common system for 
deposit guarantees and an integrated crisis 
management framework. The pernicious 
negative feedback loops between banking sector 
health and sovereign risk must be broken, and a 
banking union is a critical step in doing so. 
As important as banking sector concerns are to 
the crisis, President Barroso's reemphasised in 
his State of the Union address on 12 September 
that Europe must also pursue integration on the 
budgetary, economic and political front. 
Accordingly, the Commission services will be 
working hard over the coming weeks to follow 
up further on the President's call for a blueprint 
on a deep and genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union, including its political instruments.  
The macroeconomic backdrop to the continued 
efforts to put EMU on a more stable footing is 
challenging. The global economy is going 
through a phase of weakness, with world GDP 
and trade growth having slowed in the first half 
of 2012 and set to soften further in the second 
half. After a slightly better-than-expected first 
quarter, euro area GDP contracted in the second 
quarter by 0.2%. Recent releases of hard and soft 
indicators suggest a further contraction in the 
third quarter may be on the cards. With growth 
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being held back by private sector deleveraging, 
fiscal consolidation and a weak labour market, 
consumption and investment remain subdued. 
What we are seeing is a reflection of the 
established finding that recoveries following 
financial crises tend to be relatively drawn out. 
Ensuring the necessary macroeconomic 
adjustments in the euro area in these times of 
low growth is more challenging than in good 
times, and also more pressing. 
This edition of the Quarterly Report examines a 
number of facets of the euro area adjustment 
challenge. In its Focus section, it analyses 
external sustainability in euro-area countries, 
some of which have accumulated large net 
external liabilities. High external liabilities 
weigh on national income as they entail high 
income payments to the rest of the world. They 
can hamper growth and raise macroeconomic 
vulnerability to shocks and the risks of sudden 
stops in foreign capital inflows. A necessary 
current account rebalancing process has set in 
since the crisis that was initially driven by 
demand compression but has also been gradually 
supported by improvements in competitiveness 
and export market shares. As a result, the 
external positions of some Member States with 
large external liabilities have now moved in 
safer territory. In other Member States, however, 
further adjustment is still needed, the cost of 
which – particularly in terms of employment – 
will depend on each Member State's adjustment 
capacity. This again highlights the importance of 
appropriate structural reforms.  
In few areas is the need for adjustment as 
apparent as in public finances. But questions 
concerning the ideal speed and timing of 
consolidation have been voiced increasingly 
over the past years, with some commentators 
claiming that austerity can be self-defeating. In 
other words, through the negative impact of a 
deficit reduction on growth, debt as a share of 
GDP may not be reduced, or may even rise. A 
special topic in this edition investigates this 
claim, showing that debt ratios may indeed 
initially increase in some Member States in 
response to fiscal consolidations. This would 
tend to be the case where fiscal multipliers are 
high and initial debt ratios are elevated.  
However, such an effect is in most cases short-
lived. Only under very unlikely configurations, 
including high and persistent fiscal multipliers 
and a strong degree of short-sightedness in 
financial markets, can consolidation become 
truly self-defeating. Consolidation thus remains 
necessary to reduce debt in the medium-term.  
Although risks of truly self-defeating 
consolidation appear low, it is crucial to mitigate 
as much as possible the negative short-term 
impact of consolidation on growth. Structural 
reforms have an important role to play here. 
Another special topic in this report looks into the 
interaction between fiscal consolidation and 
labour market rigidities. It shows that labour 
market regulation does not reduce the harmful 
short-term effects of consolidation on 
employments but raises the risks of a rise in long 
term and therefore structural unemployment.  
Eleven Member States have submitted a request 
to the Commission (or are about to so) for a 
proposal to introduce a financial transaction tax 
via enhanced cooperation. Against this 
background, a final special topic studies the 
effects of introducing a securities transaction tax 
(STT) on the economy. According to the model 
simulations presented here, such a tax tends to 
reduce financial trading and to dampen 
volatility, especially of financial sector variables. 
Introduction of the tax also brings some 
efficiency gain as the amount of resources 
devoted to speculative financial transactions in 
the economy declines. On the other hand, the 
simulations also show that the STT could have 
negative side-effects for financing costs, 
productive capital and output in the long run. 
This long-term impact makes the distortive 
effects of such a tax similar to those of corporate 
income taxation, which are above those of 
personal income and value-added taxes. 
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I.1. Introduction 
The first ten years of the euro have witnessed an 
increase in differences between the external 
positions of Member States, with net external 
liabilities reaching unprecedented levels in some. 
The financial and sovereign crises have brought 
about some rebalancing of current accounts within 
the euro area, but there are so far only limited 
signs of a deleveraging of foreign asset positions, 
raising the question of the sustainability of some 
Member States’ external positions. 
This focus section presents an assessment of the 
net international investment positions (net IIPs) of 
the euro area countries with large net external 
liabilities and their adjustment needs. Section 2 
reviews recent developments in external assets 
and liabilities as well as related changes in 
investment income balances and valuation effects. 
Section 3 offers a quick survey of the available 
empirical literature on the economic implications 
of high levels of external liabilities. Section 4 
provides an assessment of external sustainability 
and external adjustment needs, while section 5 
discusses possible adjustment dynamics. Section 6 
concludes. 
I.2. Developments in external positions in 
the euro area  
A substantial deterioration of net IIPs in a 
number of Member States 
The years preceding the crisis were characterised 
by a moderate deterioration in the net 
international investment position of the euro area, 
which further accelerated during the crisis before 
reverting partially in 2011. (1) 
While the euro area’s overall net external 
liabilities remain relatively low (11.5 % of GDP in 
2011), there is considerable diversity across 
Member States (see Table I.1). During the pre-
crisis period, net external positions across euro 
area Member States displayed a markedly 
diverging trend. In particular, Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, Estonia and, to a lesser extent, Slovakia 
saw a rapid deterioration in their net IIPs. The 
deterioration was underpinned by the 
accumulation of large current account deficits and 
partly reflected large foreign direct investment 
                                                        
(1) Throughout this chapter ‘net international investment 
positions’ and ‘net external liabilities’ are used 
interchangeably. 
Focusing on euro area countries with large net external liabilities, this chapter presents an overview of recent 
developments in external assets and liabilities and analyses their economic implications, their sustainability 
and related adjustment needs. It also provides a discussion of adjustment dynamics. 
Over the last decade, differences in the external positions of euro area countries have increased substantially. 
Some Member States have accumulated large net external liabilities, raising concerns about their implications 
for growth and external sustainability. The same period has also witnessed a build-up in gross asset and 
liability holdings. In the countries concerned, rising external liabilities have led to deteriorating investment 
income balances, entailing a rising wedge between GDP and GNI. The deterioration of income balances due to 
higher liabilities has been partly contained by rapid economic growth (at least in pre-crisis years) and 
favourable yield developments, but these factors have now turned much less supportive. External positions can 
be subject to large valuation effects, which, however, seem to have a large temporary component. 
Beyond the effect on GNI, available empirical evidence indicates that high net external liabilities can weigh on 
growth and increase the economy’s vulnerability to shocks, raising the issue of the sustainability of external 
positions in some euro area countries. 
In recent years, euro area Member States with large external liabilities have gone through a current account 
rebalancing process that was first driven by demand compression but has also been gradually supported by 
improvements in competitiveness and export market shares. As a result of this process, external imbalances 
have diminished. A quantitative assessment of external sustainability shows that, notwithstanding recent 
progress, in 2011 some Member States had not yet moved to a sustainable NIIP trajectory. In these countries, 
further adjustment was still needed, the short-term impact of which — particularly in terms of employment — 
will depend on economic policies, especially in terms of structural reforms. 
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inflows in catching-up economies such as Estonia 
and Slovakia. (2) In some Member States, the 
changes in external liabilities were accompanied 
by significant valuation effects. 
 
Table I.1: Net international investment positions, 
euro area Member States 
 (% of GDP) 
2003 2007 2011
PT -58 -88 -103
IE -20 -19 -98
ES -45 -78 -92
CY 4 12 -81
EL -59 -96 -79
SK -24 -44 -64
EE -66 -72 -58
SI -6 -22 -42
IT -14 -25 -21
FR -4 -1 -16
AT -14 -18 -3
MT 40 18 6
FI -26 -28 16
DE 7 26 36
NL -2 -6 41
BE 37 29 58
LU 140 96 85
EA -6 -14 -12  
Source: Eurostat BoP data, DG ECFIN calculations. 
 
The crisis has so far led to only very limited signs 
of rebalancing in net IIPs. Estonia experienced a 
decline in its net foreign liabilities from 72 % of 
GDP in 2007 to about 58 % in 2011, partly owing 
to a strong improvement in its current account 
position. Net external liabilities also declined in 
Greece but mostly due to valuation effects (i.e. 
changes in the prices of assets and liabilities), 
mainly driven by a loss in the market value of 
Greek private- and public-sector securities, while 
the current account deficit, though improved, still 
stood at 9.8 % of GDP in 2011. Meanwhile, the 
net positions of Portugal, Spain and Slovakia 
worsened further, as improvements in current 
account deficits were not large enough to counter 
the negative dynamics of external liabilities. (3) 
The group of euro area Member States with large 
external liabilities has expanded as a result of the 
crisis, due to rapidly deteriorating net IIPs in 
Cyprus and Ireland. The deterioration reflected 
mostly large negative valuation effects, although 
current account deficits also played a role. The 
                                                        
(2) The deterioration in net IIPs is a common trend in most 
central and eastern european EU countries, where the 
catching-up process has generally been accompanied by large 
foreign direct investment inflows. 
(3) In Portugal and Spain, the contraction in GDP also 
contributed to increase the negative external position to GDP 
ratio and there were less liability-reducing valuation effects 
than in Greece. 
remainder of this chapter will therefore focus on 
an ‘enlarged group’ of 8 Member States with 
sizeable negative net IIPs in 2011 (PT, EL, IE, 
ES, EE, SK, CY and SI). 
Over the past decade, the deterioration of net IIPs 
was accompanied by a rapid build-up of gross 
asset and liability positions, reflecting rapid cross-
border financial integration (Table I.2). In relation 
to GDP, gross positions are particularly large in 
Ireland and Cyprus. They are instead well below 
the euro area average in Slovakia and Slovenia. 
As discussed later in this section, large gross 
positions increase the risk of so-called valuation 
effects (i.e. capital gains or losses caused by 
fluctuations in asset prices and exchange rates). 
 
Table I.2: Gross external assets and liabilities, 
euro area MS with large negative NIIPs  
(% GDP) 
2003 (1) 2007 2011 2003 (1) 2007 2011
EE 56 97 107 122 169 165
IE 762 1180 1670 782 1200 1768
EL 52 85 102 111 182 181
ES 102 121 118 154 199 210
CY 199 394 458 199 382 539
PT 103 178 172 205 266 274
SI 49 99 91 69 121 132
SK 31 24 53 66 85 118
EA 105 157 169 116 170 181
Assets Liabilities
 
(1) ES, SI: 2004 data. 
Source: Eurostat BoP data, ECFIN calculations. 
 
Rising net external liabilities have led to 
deteriorating investment income balances 
Member States with high negative net IIPs all post 
negative investment income balances, which drive 
a significant wedge between GDP and GNI and 
represent a sizeable income outflow to the rest of 
the world. The magnitude of the deficits varies 
significantly across countries, ranging from 
around 2 % of GDP in Slovenia and Spain to 20 % 
in Ireland with other Member States clustered 
between 4 and 6 % of GDP (Graph I.1). 
Differences in the size of the investment income 
balance are related to some extent to differences 
in net external liabilities, but also reflect large 
differences in implicit average yields on foreign 
assets and liabilities. (4) For most of the 
8 Member States analysed here, the implicit yields 
on external liabilities tend to be higher than the 
                                                        
(4) Implicit yields are calculated as the ratio of investment 
income paid (received) to gross liabilities (assets). 
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implicit yields on external assets (Graph I.2). This 
yield gap is strongly negative for catching-up 
economies such as Estonia and Slovakia and is 
only (modestly) positive in Spain, which explains 
the relatively low income balance deficit in that 
country. (5) 
Graph I.1: Investment income balance, euro area 
MS with large negative NIIPs  
(% of GDP) 
-24
-20
-16
-12
-8
-4
0
EE IE EL ES CY PT SI SK
1999
2007
2011
 
Source: Eurostat BoP data, ECFIN calculations. 
Turning to the dynamics of investment income 
balances, a rise in deficits was observed in pre-
crisis years in all the Member States considered 
apart from Ireland and Greece. However, the rise 
appears relatively contained in the light of the 
large deterioration in external positions. Table I.3 
provides a decomposition of changes in income 
balances, which shows that, although rising net 
liabilities indeed contributed to deteriorating 
investment income balances in pre-crisis years, 
the effect was partly offset by rapid nominal GDP 
growth and, in a majority of the Member States 
concerned, by improving yield conditions. 
Turning to the post-crisis picture, investment 
income balances have somewhat improved since 
2007 in most of the Member States with large 
external liabilities. While external liabilities have 
continued to increase, these negative pressures on 
balances have generally been more than offset by 
cuts in implicit yields (at least up to 2010), 
reflecting lower profits by corporations and lower 
interest rates on debt. The improvement in income 
balances since the crisis therefore appears to be 
largely of a temporary nature and should soon be 
followed by another period of deterioration as the 
                                                        
(5) The yield gap is, in large part, accounted for by differences in 
the share of equity and FDI in total assets and total liabilities. 
Equity holdings tend on average to command higher (though 
more volatile) implicit yields than debt instruments.  
increasing risk premia on the external liabilities of 
Member States with large negative net IIPs 
brought about by the crisis progressively feed into 
implicit yields. 
Graph I.2: Difference in implicit yields between 
external assets and liabilities, euro area MS with 
large negative NIIPs  
(in pp, 2004-11 averages) (1) 
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
EE IE EL ES CY PT SI SK  
(1) Yields are calculated as the ratio of investment income 
received from / paid to the rest of the world to assets / liabilities. 
Period covered: 2004-11 except for SI (2007-11) and SK (2008-
11). 
Source: Eurostat BoP data, ECFIN calculations. 
 
 
Table I.3: Decomposition of changes in 
investment income, euro area MS with large 
negative NIIPs 
(pp of GDP) 
Assets and 
liabilities
Returns on 
assets and 
liabilities
GDP growth
EE -3.8 -4.3 -1.7 2.2
IE 4.4 -16.9 15.7 5.5
EL (1) 1.3 1.5 0.2 -0.4
ES -0.6 -2.2 1.0 0.6
CY -1.9 -4.1 1.2 0.9
PT -1.6 -1.5 -0.5 0.4
SI -1.2 -1.7 0.1 0.4
SK -4.2 -1.5 -3.5 0.8
EE 1.5 0.7 1.8 -1.0
IE -4.1 -5.3 4.1 -3.0
EL 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1
ES 0.8 -0.4 1.2 0.0
CY 3.0 -5.3 7.9 0.4
PT -0.3 -0.9 0.5 0.1
SI 0.5 -0.7 1.1 0.1
SK 2.4 -1.7 3.7 0.4
due to changes in:
2002-07
2007-10
Total change 
in income 
balance
 
(1) 2005-2007 for EL. 
Source: Eurostat national accounts data, ECFIN 
calculations. 
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Large but mostly temporary valuation effects 
The economic and financial crisis of 2007-2009 
and its aftermath has led to pronounced global 
asset price swings and contributed to sizeable 
valuation effects in the net foreign positions of 
euro area Member States. (6) Valuation effects 
can occur when prices of foreign assets and 
liabilities fluctuate, resulting in changes in the 
market value of gross asset and liability positions 
and ultimately in the net IIP. In the presence of 
significant valuation effects, changes in the net 
IIP are no longer determined only by the current 
and capital account balance. 
Valuation effects can be approximated by 
comparing changes in the net IIP with underlying 
cross-border financial transactions. (7) Graph I.3 
suggests that, in the majority of Member States 
with large external liabilities, the cumulative 
effect of valuation effects on a country’s net IIP 
has generally been self-limiting, and in the 
majority of cases self-correcting. Over the period 
2000Q1-2012Q1, the largest swings in valuation 
effects are observed for Ireland, Cyprus, Greece, 
and Spain. In Cyprus and Greece, there is strong 
evidence of self-correction, with turning points in 
both cases in the course of 2007. However, 
valuation effects appear to be more persistent in 
Ireland and, to a much lesser degree, in Spain. 
The large negative valuation effects observed in 
the chart can mostly be traced back to the 
portfolio component of balance sheets. (8) In 
Ireland, large valuation effects mostly reflected 
the country’s very large gross asset and liability 
positions rather than large swings in prices of 
specific assets. Large gross positions mean that 
even small price changes can entail large 
valuation changes, as a given price change acts on 
a bigger stock of financial instruments. In Cyprus, 
valuation changes were dominated by price 
                                                        
(6) Valuation effects are discussed in detail in N. Balta (2010): 
‘The importance of valuation effects for external asset 
       positions in the euro area’, Quarterly report on the euro area, 
Vol.9 No.1, March 2010. For an overview of valuation 
effects in the UK and the US, see R. Kuenzel (2011): ‘The 
UK's external position’, in: Giudice, G., R. Kuenzel and T. 
Springbett (eds.): UK Economy – The Crisis in Perspective, 
Routledge: London, 2011. 
(7) Valuation effects are regularly applied by national 
statisticians to IIP stock data, but these adjustments are 
typically not publicly available. Valuation effects (as well as 
other volume changes as well as errors and omissions) are 
therefore approximated as the difference between IIP stock 
changes and financial (or current) account flows.  
(8) Ireland’s large valuation effects for portfolio liabilities may 
have been influenced by a large debt-equity swap conducted 
in Q4 2010 as part of the EU/IMF assistance programme (see 
QREA (2012), Vol.11 No.1, p.28 for further details). 
changes although large gross asset and liability 
positions also played a role. By contrast, in 
Greece and Spain valuation effects were mostly 
attributable to price changes. 
Graph I.3: Cumulative valuation effects,  
euro area MS with large negative NIIPs 
(Q4-2000- Q1-2012, pp of GDP) (1) 
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Source: Eurostat BoP data, DG ECFIN calculations. 
Overall, the evidence provided in Graph I.3 
suggests that the IIPs of euro area Member States 
can be subject to large valuation effects, which, 
however, appear to have a large temporary 
component. Further work would be needed to 
better understand the drivers of valuation effects, 
but the assessment of the net IIP dynamics 
presented in section 1.4 will assume the absence 
of systematic valuation effects over long periods 
of time (say two decades or more). 
I.3. Economic implications of high 
external liabilities 
High levels of external liabilities may affect 
growth… 
In addition to its implications in terms of 
disposable income (via negative investment 
income balances), a high level of net external 
liabilities may also affect growth and the 
economy’s vulnerability to shocks. 
Moderate levels of external liabilities can have 
beneficial effects on welfare and growth. In 
theory, cross-country lending and borrowing 
allow consumption smoothing and a more 
efficient allocation of saving and investment. As 
long as the capital flows are allocated to 
productive uses, they sustain future growth and 
the capacity to reimburse the capital borrowed. In 
neoclassical growth models, capital mobility leads 
to higher transitional growth as it allows faster 
I. The dynamics of international investment positions 
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accumulation of capital in countries with 
comparatively high marginal factor productivity. 
However, high external liabilities can also be 
associated with a number of economic distortions. 
For example, a public debt overhang can translate 
into higher distortionary taxation or a decline in 
public investment, thereby hampering growth. 
Similarly, high liabilities at the household level 
are likely to lead to a decline in aggregate 
demand. (9) Moreover, the increase in uncertainty 
can lead investors to engage in short-term 
investment rather than in higher-risk long-term 
productive investment.  
…and increase vulnerability to shocks 
High external liabilities are also likely to amplify 
business cycles and heighten a country’s credit 
risk and financial stability risks. A high level of 
net liabilities makes the economy more vulnerable 
to shocks that might affect the ability of the 
country to service or rollover external liabilities, 
such as a weakening of economic growth or sharp 
changes in asset prices. Graph I.4 provides an 
illustration of this vulnerability in the shape of a 
significant negative correlation between sovereign 
spreads and net foreign liabilities within the euro 
area. In the worst cases, and as shown by some 
euro area Member States in recent years, the 
vulnerability related to high external liabilities can 
materialise in the form of sudden stops of foreign 
capital inflows. (10)  
Large capital inflows can translate into credit 
bubbles such as those experienced by a number of 
euro area Member States. The bursting of such 
bubbles involves long periods of slow growth as 
demand is depressed by balance sheet adjustment. 
While financial integration usually allows better 
cross-country allocation of capital, high levels of 
net foreign liabilities tend to increase the financial 
fragility of the economy and expose it to a 
heightened risk of asset-price and credit boom-
and-bust cycles. 
In addition to the level of net foreign liabilities, 
large gross positions also play a prominent role in 
determining financial risk. First of all, the 
existence of large stocks of assets and liabilities 
                                                        
(9) For these arguments, see Reinhart C.M., V.R. Reinhart and 
K.S. Rogoff (2012), ‘Debt Overhangs: Past and Present’, 
NBER Working Paper 18015. 
(10) However, the correlation in the chart should not be 
interpreted as suggesting a stable relationship between net 
IIPs and sovereign spreads, but rather as reflecting conditions 
prevailing over the period taken into account. 
implies that changes in asset prices can lead to 
wide variations in the international investment 
position. Second, the presence of balance sheet 
liquidity and maturity mismatches is an important 
indicator of financial instability and is a key 
determinant of the impact of a sudden stop 
scenario on the economy (see Obstfeld, 2012). (11) 
Graph I.4: Net IIPs and sovereign spreads 
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Empirical evidence provides support for the 
idea that foreign liabilities may overshoot  
The empirical literature on the economic 
implications of external asset positions has 
followed two broad avenues exploring 
respectively their effect on crisis risks and growth. 
The ratio of net foreign liabilities to GDP has long 
been regarded as an indicator of default risk. A 
number of empirical studies have tested the link 
between external debt and the likelihood of crisis’ 
episodes. For example, Catão and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2012) find that crises (12) are typically 
characterised by a deterioration of the external 
position in the run-up to their outbreak and that, 
beyond a certain net IIP level, the risk of crisis 
grows with further net liability exposure. As a 
result of rises in trade openness and financial 
integration, this threshold may have shifted 
upward to about 50 to 60 % of GDP in recent 
years. (13) 
The composition of foreign assets and liabilities 
also plays a fundamental role in affecting the 
                                                        
(11) Obstfeld, M. (2012), ‘Does the current account still matter?’, 
NBER Working Paper 17877. 
(12) Defined as an outright external default or the disbursement of 
a large multilateral support package. 
(13) Catão A. and Milesi-Ferretti G. (2012), ‘External liabilities 
and crisis risk’, unpublished manuscript. 
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degree of external vulnerability of a country (see, 
for a discussion, Furceri, Guichard and Rusticelli, 
2012). (14) In particular, the presence in total 
liabilities of excessive levels of non-contingent 
liabilities, i.e. liabilities that require the repayment 
of the principal or interest, is likely to increase the 
risk of crises, while equity has a looser link with 
crisis events. This is supported by the empirical 
literature, for example the cited study by Catão 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2012), whose findings 
suggest that debt positions are more important 
than equity positions in explaining crises. 
Turning to the link with growth, the existence of 
positive and negative effects of external liabilities 
would suggest some non-linear relationship with 
growth. This conjecture is, to some extent, 
confirmed by the available empirical evidence. In 
the case of emerging markets, a number of studies 
have documented a negative and non-linear 
relation between external liabilities and growth. 
For example, Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci (2011) 
use a large panel of developing countries and 
estimate that the average impact of gross external 
debt becomes negative at about 35-40 % of 
GDP. (15) Imbs and Ranciere (2005) report a 
similar finding with a threshold of about 60 % of 
GDP. (16) 
Available evidence is unfortunately much thinner 
for advanced economies, but the threshold is 
probably higher than in emerging markets. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) (17) find that growth 
in emerging markets deteriorates markedly above 
a ratio of gross external debt to GDP over 60 %, 
while the threshold estimated for advanced 
countries in Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff (2012) 
is considerably higher (90 %). The idea of 
possible threshold effects is also supported 
indirectly by a burgeoning literature on the links 
between the liabilities of specific institutional 
sectors and macroeconomic growth. For example, 
                                                        
(14) Furceri D, S. Guichard and E. Rusticelli (2012), ‘Medium-
term determinants of international investment postions: the 
role of structural policies’, Journal of International 
Commerce, Economics and Policy, Vol. 3 No 2. 
(15) Pattillo C., H. Poirson and L. Ricci (2011), ‘External debt and 
growth’, Review of Economics and Institutions, Vol. 2 No 3. 
(16) Imbs J. and R. Ranciere (2005), ‘The overhang hangover’, 
CEPR Discussion Paper 5210. See, also, Checherita C. and P. 
Rother (2010), ‘The impact of high and growing government 
debt on economic growth: an empirical investigation for the 
euro area’, ECB Working Paper No 1237 (limited to 
government debt) and Cordella T., L. Ricci and M. Ruiz-
Arranz (2005), ‘Debt overhang or debt irrelevance? 
Revisiting the debt-growth link’, IMF Working Paper No 
05/223. 
(17) Reinhart C.M. and Rogoff K.S. (2010), ‘Growth in a time of 
debt’, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 
100 pp. 573-578. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) find that median 
average GDP growth rates fall rapidly when 
public sector debt-to-GDP ratios exceed 90 %. 
Similarly, Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli 
(2011) (18) report a threshold of about 85 % for 
public sector debt and 90 % for corporate debt. 
Overall, the available literature backs the idea that 
excessive external liabilities can have a negative 
effect on growth and macroeconomic stability. 
The conclusion suggests that the sustainability of 
external positions (together with current account 
imbalances) should be a key focus of 
macroeconomic surveillance. This is now the case 
in the euro area with the latest institutional 
enhancements of the economic governance. Both 
concepts have a particular relevance in the context 
of the macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP) 
which was set up in the context of the so-called 6-
pack. (19) 
I.4. Assessing the sustainability of 
international investment positions  
Further current account rebalancing is needed 
in some Member States  
A basic tool to assess the sustainability of external 
positions is to calculate the improvement in the 
primary current account (20) needed to stabilise 
the net IIP. Table I.4 (col. d) shows that, for a 
number of euro area Member States with large 
negative net IIPs, current account positions in 
2011 were still below the level needed to stabilise 
the external position. The gap appears particularly 
large in Greece and significant although smaller in 
Portugal. The gap is also very large in Cyprus but 
the estimate should be taken with caution as there 
are indications that the 2011 level of the current 
account will soon be revised significantly 
upwards, thereby reducing the gap considerably. 
Estonia, Ireland and Slovakia show a significant 
positive gap. In these three countries, the current 
account position is already significantly above the 
level that stabilises the external position. 
                                                        
(18) Cecchetti, S.G., M.S. Mohanty and F. Zampolli (2011), ‘The 
Real Effects of Debt’, BIS Working Paper No. 352. 
(19) For more information on the macroeconomic imbalance 
procedure, see Fischer, J., A. Hobza and A. Mordonu (2012) 
‘The surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances in the euro 
area’, QREA I/2012, European Commission (2012), 
‘Scoreboard for the surveillance of macroeconomic 
imbalances’, European Economy - Occasional Papers, 92, 
and European Commission (2012), ‘Macroeconomic 
Imbalances’, European Economy - Occasional Papers, 99 to 
110. 
(20) i.e. the current account excluding the investment income 
balance. 
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Table I.4: Current account gaps, euro area MS 
with large negative NIIPs  
(2011, % of GDP) 
Actual current 
account
Primary 
current 
account (1)
IIP stabilising 
primary CA 
(2)
Gap with 
primary CA 
a b c d=b-c
EE 2.9 9.7 -0.6 10.3
IE 0.7 20.9 18.5 2.4
EL -9.8 -5.7 0.6 -6.4
ES -3.5 -1.1 -1.2 0.1
CY -10.4 -5.6 3.3 -8.9
PT -6.4 -1.5 -0.1 -1.4
SI 0.0 2.2 1.6 0.6
SK 0.1 4.2 0.4 3.9  
(1) Current account excluding the investment income balance 
(2) Calculated assuming that the balance of the capital account 
stays constant at its 2011 level. 
Source: DG ECFIN. 
 
The estimates of current account gaps presented in 
Table I.4 should be nuanced in a number of ways. 
First, the gap is calculated relative to the actual 
current account in 2011. This may not capture 
properly the rebalancing effort needed because the 
current account may in part be driven by cyclical 
factors. There are good reasons to believe that the 
ongoing current account rebalancing process in 
the euro area is partly structural in nature. (21) 
However, in some of the countries shown in 
Table I.4, the cyclical position is currently 
significantly weaker than in the rest of the euro 
area. In these countries, the current account is 
partly pushed up by cyclical (and therefore 
temporary) factors. Table I.5 (col. d) points to a 
comparatively weaker cyclical position in Greece 
and, to a lesser degree, Spain. In these two 
countries the estimate of the current account gap 
probably underestimates the required adjustment. 
Second, the estimates are based on the strong 
assumption of the absence of valuation effects. As 
highlighted in the previous section, it is difficult 
to identify on the basis of the available data 
systematic trends in valuation effects that could be 
incorporated in the estimates. This does not mean, 
however, that substantial valuation effects could 
not materialise and either increase the required 
current account adjustment or reduce it. Risks of 
significant valuation effects appear larger for 
Member States with very large gross asset and 
liability positions (IE, CY). 
 
                                                        
(21) European Commission (2012), ‘European economic forecast, 
spring 2012’, European Economy No. 1, pp 35-38. 
Estimates of the net IIP-stabilising current 
account should be seen as a minimum adjustment 
requirement in terms of external sustainability. As 
discussed in the previous sections, there is 
evidence that large net external liabilities can have 
negative effects on growth and macroeconomic 
stability and net external liabilities have reached 
unprecedented levels in a number of euro area 
Member States. For a more cautious assessment 
of the rebalancing needed to ensure external 
sustainability, a more appropriate benchmark may 
be the level of the current account that is required 
to push up the net IIP to a specific target. 
Table I.5 (cols b and c) presents the current 
account necessary for the net IIP to reach 50 % of 
GDP after 20 years. In the absence of consensual 
estimates as to what constitutes a ‘good’ level of 
external liabilities, the choice of any target is 
somewhat arbitrary. The 50 % level appears 
broadly in line with the literature discussed earlier 
and would bring the net IIP back to levels seen in 
the early 2000s (EE, EL, PT) or mid-2000s (ES). 
 
Table I.5: Current account gaps (cont.), euro 
area MS with large negative NIIP  
(2011, % of GDP) 
Primary 
current 
account (1)
Primary CA 
which 
reduces IIP 
to -50% (2)
Gap with 
primary CA 
Relative 
cyclical 
position
a b c=a-b d
EE 9.7 -0.3 10.0 0.2
IE 20.9 21.4 -0.4 -1.0
EL -5.7 2.1 -7.8 -6.7
ES -1.1 1.0 -2.1 -2.0
CY -5.6 5.2 -10.8 1.1
PT -1.5 2.5 -4.0 -1.0
SI 2.2 1.1 1.1 -1.4
SK 4.2 1.1 3.2 1.2  
(1) Current account excluding the investment income balance  
(2) Calculated assuming that the balance of the capital account 
remains constant at its 2011 level. 
Source: DG ECFIN. 
 
Such a more ambitious target would leave 
Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia with a positive 
gap. For the other countries, the negative gap 
would be higher (in absolute value) than for the 
IIP-stabilising estimates, with the differences in 
the range of 1.5-3 % reflecting differences in the 
size of external liabilities. It is noteworthy that 
both Spain and, notably, Portugal would then face 
significant negative gaps. The Irish gap would fall 
slightly into negative territory. (22) 
                                                        
(22) It is important to stress that the estimates of the current 
account gap are based on a simple ‘accumulation’ equation 
relating changes in the IIP to the primary current account and 
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Estimates of adjustment needs are sensitive to 
growth and interest rate assumptions  
Estimates of the IIP-stabilising current account 
are based on a number of assumptions regarding 
growth and interest rates. Table I.6 shows the 
assumptions underlying the estimates presented in 
Tables I.4 and I.5. The yield assumptions are 
derived from medium-term averages of implicit 
yields calculated by relating balance of payment 
flow and stock data (see also footnote 2 in 
section 1.2.). For most countries, the averages are 
calculated for the period 2004-11, covering both 4 
years before the crisis and 4 years after. GDP 
growth assumptions are taken from the 
projections presented in the latest European 
Commission’s Fiscal Sustainability Report. (23) 
 
Table I.6: Assumptions underlying the estimates 
of IIP-stabilising current account 
Yield on 
assets 
(% of assets)
Yields on 
liabilities 
(% of 
liabilities)
Yield gap Nominal GDP 
growth 
(aa in %)
a b c=a-b d
EE 4.3 6.1 -1.9 4.5
IE 2.8 3.9 -1.1 4.5
EL 2.0 3.1 -1.2 2.7
ES 3.4 3.3 0.1 4.0
CY 2.7 3.5 -0.9 3.8
PT 3.3 3.7 -0.3 3.3
SI 2.0 3.3 -1.3 3.5
SK 3.5 5.1 -1.6 4.3  
Source: DG ECFIN. 
 
To get a better sense of the sensitivity of the 
estimates to these assumptions, Table I.7 shows 
how the gap between the IIP-stabilising current 
account and the actual current account changes 
when growth and interest rate assumptions are 
modified. Two points are noteworthy. 
• First, results show a comparatively higher 
sensitivity of the current account gap to the 
yield gap assumptions than to the growth or 
yield assumptions. The yield gap therefore 
                                                                                  
the gross asset and liability positions under certain yields and 
growth assumptions. As already stressed, the equation does 
not factor in valuation effects, nor does it take into account 
possible feedback effects from changes in the net IIP on 
yields or growth which are assumed to be constant. Such 
feedback effects could be significant. For instance, a lower 
net IIP is likely to be associated with lower yields on 
liabilities as financial markets’ assessment of sustainability 
improves and risk premia decrease. Such complex 
interactions can only be captured in a general equilibrium 
model and require further research work.  
(23) European Commission, ‘Fiscal Sustainability Report 2012’, 
European Economy (forthcoming). 
emerges as a major source of uncertainty or 
risk in the sustainability analysis. 
• Second, the sensitivity of the current account 
gap estimates to changes in underlying 
assumptions varies across Member States. 
Sensitivity to growth and overall yields is 
mostly related to the net IIPs. On the other 
hand, the sensitivity to the yield gap mostly 
reflects the size of gross IIPs. Uncertainty in 
estimates of the current account adjustment 
required to stabilise the net IIP appears 
comparatively much higher for Ireland but also 
for Cyprus and, to a lesser degree, Portugal. 
Overall, the sensitivity analysis further backs the 
idea that estimates of the required adjustment 
effort based on the IIP-stabilising assumption 
should be seen as a minimum benchmark. Putting 
Member States’ net IIP trajectories on a 
sustainable path in a context of uncertain 
projections of growth and interest rates would 
justify more ambitious adjustment efforts 
involving some decrease in external liabilities 
rather than just stabilisation. 
 
Table I.7: Sensitivity of the current account gap 
to growth and interest rate assumptions  
(pp of GDP) (1) 
1 % drop in GDP 
growth
1 % rise in yields 
(2)
0.5 pp rise in the 
yield gap (3)
a b c
EE 0.6 0.6 0.8
IE 1.2 1.0 8.7
EL 0.8 0.8 0.9
ES 0.9 0.9 1.1
CY 0.8 0.8 2.6
PT 1.0 1.0 1.4
SI 0.4 0.4 0.6
SK 0.6 0.6 0.6  
(1) Changes in the estimates of the primary current account gap 
when growth and yield assumptions are changed. 
(2) 1 pp simultaneous rise in yields on assets and liabilities. 
(3) 1 pp increase in yields on liabilities. 
Source: DG ECFIN. 
 
Sustainability also depends on the composition 
of balance sheets 
While the assessment has so far focused on the 
total net and gross size of the asset and liability 
positions, their composition also has important 
potential implications for external sustainability. 
A first important element is the mix of debt and 
equity in the external position. As discussed, 
differences in the mix can be associated with 
sizeable differentials in the yields on external 
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assets and liabilities. Also, a high share of debt in 
external liabilities can increase the vulnerability 
of the economy in the event of a negative growth 
shock, as debt repayments do not change with the 
economic situation of the country, while 
dividends on equity fall with earnings. 
A second element to consider when assessing the 
sustainability of the external position is the 
residual maturity of debt. In fact, a maturity 
mismatch between short-term liabilities and long-
term assets exposes the economy to an interest 
rate risk, as higher interest rates might have to be 
paid in order to increase liquidity, and to a 
rollover risk, as investors might decide not to roll 
over maturing debt. Besides, even in the absence 
of a maturity mismatch between assets and 
liabilities, a large share of liabilities with short 
residual maturity exposes the economy to such 
risks if the creditworthiness of the country is low. 
 
Table I.8: Share of total and short-term debt in 
total liabilities, euro area countries with large 
negative NIIPs (2010, in %) (1) 
Debt Short-term debt
EE 51 33
IE 51 23
EL 93 47
ES 74 27
CY 85 75
PT 74 37
SI 72 15
SK 47 28
EA-17 63 28  
(1) Debt is defined as the sum of currency and deposits, 
securities other than shares and loans. 
Source: Eurostat national account data, DG ECFIN 
calculations. 
 
Table I.8 shows that in 2010 the share of debt in 
total liabilities was well above the euro area 
average in Cyprus and Greece, and, to a lesser 
extent, in Spain, Portugal and Slovenia. The table 
also gives the proportion of short-term debt in 
total liabilities, which is particularly high in 
Cyprus and Greece. (24) 
A third related element to consider is the relative 
importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
total liabilities. A large share of FDI can 
potentially reduce the vulnerability of the 
economy, as FDI inflows allow risk-sharing with 
foreign investors, as their profitability is linked to 
                                                        
(24) The share of short-term debt in total liabilities is here used as 
a proxy for the proportion of debt with short (less than one 
year) residual maturity. 
the performance of the investment, and there is 
some evidence that they are more stable than debt 
inflows. (25) On the downside, however, returns 
on FDI liabilities can be higher than returns on 
debt. Graph I.5 shows that the share of FDI in 
total liabilities is particularly large in catching-up 
economies such as Estonia and Slovakia, while is 
smaller in Slovenia, where reliance on debt-
financing is higher (see Table I.8). 
Graph I.5: Share of foreign direct investment in 
total liabilities, euro area countries with large 
negative NIIPs (2011, in %) 
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Source: Eurostat BoP data, DG ECFIN calculations. 
Summing up …  
Overall, three points emerge from the analysis of 
the dynamics of net IIPs. 
• First, in 2011 (last available historical data) the 
current account rebalancing process that had 
started with the global economic and financial 
crisis still had some way to go in the euro area. 
That year, Greece posted current account 
balances that were still far below the IIP-
stabilising level. Setting net IIP on a clear 
downward trajectory would also have required 
further current account adjustment in Cyprus, 
Portugal and Spain. 
• Second, estimates of the current account 
required to stabilise the IIP are sensitive to 
assumptions in terms of growth and yields. 
This is particularly true for countries with 
large gross asset and liability positions (IE, 
CY). The uncertainty surrounding these 
estimates calls for a cautious approach to the 
assessment of external sustainability, with 
                                                        
(25) See, for example, Kose M.A., Eswar P, Rogoff K. and S. Wei 
(2006), ‘Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal’, IMF 
Working Paper No 06/189. 
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estimates of the IIP-stabilising current account 
to be seen as a minimum benchmark. 
• Third, balance sheet composition also matters 
for the assessment of external sustainability. In 
the absence of appropriate data, this section 
only offers a rudimentary analysis, which, 
however, points to the relative vulnerability of 
some countries due to a high share of debt (EL 
and CY) and/or short-term debt (EL) in total 
liabilities. 
I.5. Rebalancing international investment 
positions  
As the previous section has pointed to the 
unsustainable dynamics of net IIPs in some 
Member States, the present section discusses the 
possible drivers of an IIP adjustment process and 
its economic implications, together with some 
considerations on the on-going adjustment process 
across euro area Member States. 
The mechanics of the adjustment  
The net IIP is the sum of the net asset positions of 
domestic economic agents’ (households, 
corporation and the public sector). Changes in the 
net IIP therefore necessarily mirror changes in the 
net assets of some or all of these agents. In other 
words, abstracting from valuation effects, an 
improvement in the net IIP requires an adjustment 
of the balance sheets of these agents with either 
cuts in investment and/or increases in savings. 
Balance sheet consolidation takes place when 
economic agents realise that their own balance 
sheet positions are no longer sustainable or when 
creditors force them to consolidate by demanding 
higher interest rates. A consolidation of private 
sector balance sheets triggered by changes in risk 
behaviour and lending practices has been at the 
root of the improvements in current accounts 
observed in the euro area countries with large 
external liabilities since the beginning of the 
crisis. Since 2010, the trend has been reinforced 
by budgetary consolidation. 
Turning to the economic implications of an IIP 
adjustment, large negative net IIPs generally 
reflect a long period of accumulation of current 
account deficits signalling a persistent excess of 
domestic demand over production. (26)  
                                                        
(26) Exceptions are Member States such as Ireland or Cyprus 
where large negative valuation effects in the wake of the 
 
Improvement of the IIP requires a reduction in 
domestic demand, which affects both 
domestically produced and imported goods. It 
must therefore be accompanied by a decline in 
prices to curb the excess supply of domestic 
goods and boost competitiveness and exports. It is 
also likely to require a shift of resources from the 
non-tradable to the tradable sector. The 
accumulation of current account deficits can be 
associated with distortions in the sectoral 
composition of production with excessive growth 
in the non-tradable sector, notably housing. (27) 
As the required price adjustment and sectoral 
reallocations of labour and capital take time, a 
rebalancing of the international investment 
position is likely to be associated with a period of 
excess supply with negative implications for 
growth and employment in the short term. 
External adjustment is underway  
Although further progress is needed in a number 
of Member States, available evidence shows that 
adjustment to external imbalances is underway for 
euro area countries with large external liabilities, 
with the steps of the "mechanics" described above 
now unfolding progressively. As shown in 
Graph I.6, euro area Member States with large 
negative net IIPs have all seen large current 
account improvements since the start of the crisis. 
Graph I.6: NIIP position in 2011 and changes in 
current account (2007-2011),   
euro area Member States 
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Source: Eurostat BoP data, DG ECFIN calculations. 
                                                                                  
financial crisis also played a major role in the deterioration of 
the IIP. 
(27) See European Commission (2011), ‘Sectoral implications of 
external rebalancing’, Quarterly Report on the Euro Area, 
Vol. 10 No 3. 
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In its early stages, the current account rebalancing 
was mostly driven by demand compression as is 
usually the case in this sort of adjustment. (28) The 
changes in the current account have, however, 
been followed – with a one or two year lag – by 
improvements in the real exchange rate. The latter 
partly reflect changes in the euro’s nominal 
effective exchange rate but also competititveness 
rebalancing within the euro area. Graph I.7 shows 
a negative correlation between changes in real 
exchange rate and net IIPs in the euro area, with 
the Member States with large external liabilities 
posting larger gains in competitiveness than most 
of the others. 
 
Graph I.7: NIIP in 2011 and change in  
exchange rates (2009Q4-2012Q2),  
euro area Member States 
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Changes in relative prices have generally gone 
hand in hand with gains in export market shares, 
suggesting early signs of a rebalancing towards 
the tradable sector. With the notable exception of 
Greece and, to a lesser extent, Slovenia, Member 
States with large external liabilities have 
experienced significant gains in export market 
shares (Graph I.8). Such export gains have also 
taken place in a few countries with positive net 
external assets (e.g. DE, NL). 
 
                                                        
(28) Evidence that current account adjustment in deficit countries 
since the crisis has largely relied on expenditure reduction is 
not restricted to the euro area. See Lane P.R. and G.M. 
Milesi-Ferretti (2011), ‘External adjustment and the global 
crisis’, IMF Working Paper WP/11/197. 
Graph I.8: Change in export market shares  
(2007-2011), euro area countries with large 
negative NIIPs 
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Source: DG ECFIN. 
Good policies can make a difference 
The economic impact of a rebalancing of external 
positions – notably the short-term loss in growth – 
depends on a broad range of country-specific 
structural characteristics such as the degree of 
price and wage rigidity, rigidities in labour and 
capital allocation processes and trend growth. 
This suggests room for policies to alleviate the 
burden of the adjustment. 
A full quantitative understanding of external 
adjustment processes requires a full-fledged 
structural macroeconomic model. Box I.1 presents 
an estimated model for Spain that is used to 
illustrate possible rebalancing scenarios. Three 
scenarios are considered: a baseline scenario 
reflecting the conditions prevailing during the 
period of estimation of the model; a scenario 
where net foreign liabilities move on a downward 
trajectory and stabilise at 35 % of GDP in the long 
run; and a scenario where the reduction in net 
external liabilities to GDP is accompanied by 
wage moderation. 
In the baseline scenario, net foreign liabilities 
stabilise gradually to a level above 100 % of GDP 
(blue solid line in Graph I.9). The stabilisation, 
although at a high level, requires a trade balance 
surplus and an expenditure reduction, in particular 
in consumption, that falls to a level closer to the 
euro area average. The process is accompanied by 
a period of deflation and a decline in employment. 
The baseline scenario rests on the assumption that 
investors’ risk behaviour remains mostly in pre-
crisis mode. As the crisis is likely to have deeply 
and durably affected risk behaviours, a second 
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scenario (pink solid line in Graph I.9) illustrates 
what would happen in a more risk-averse scenario 
leading to a large improvement in net foreign 
liabilities. The trade balance adjustment is more 
sizeable than in the baseline and is accompanied 
by a much sharper contraction in domestic 
demand and a more prolonged period of deflation. 
The consumption share in GDP and the 
employment rate fall further and GDP declines 
temporarily more than during the 2009 recession. 
The high costs of the adjustment raise the issue of 
whether policies alleviating the adverse effects of 
the rebalancing process, in particular on 
employment, can be identified. The third scenario 
(light blue dashed line in Graph I.9) assesses 
whether a reduction in real wage growth (e.g. due 
to labour market reforms) accompanying the 
rebalancing of the external position can ease the 
adjustment. In this scenario, lower wage growth 
reduces consumption further and initially leads to 
a sharper contraction of demand than in the first 
two scenarios. However, lower unit labour costs 
and a larger drop in the real interest rate boost 
exports and help improve the trade balance. 
Employment recovers considerably faster and 
reaches a higher level than in the absence of wage 
moderation, supporting a quicker recovery of 
GDP growth. These results suggest that structural 
reforms of the labour market can help soften the 
negative short-term impact of the rebalancing 
process on growth and employment. 
I.6. Conclusions 
This focus section has looked into the build-up of 
large negative international investment positions 
in a range of euro area Member States. Large 
negative net IIPs entail significant deficits in 
terms of investment income balances that weigh 
on national income. In pre-crisis years, the build-
up led to a deterioration in the income balances of 
 
 
Box I.1: The QUEST simulation model for Spain
QUEST III is the global macroeconomic model used for macroeconomic policy analysis and research in the 
European Commission. (1) The model version used here is estimated for Spain as an open economy in a monetary 
union. The economy produces goods that are imperfect substitutes to goods produced in the rest of the world. 
Households engage in international financial markets and there is near-perfect international capital mobility. There 
are three production sectors: a final goods production sector, an investment goods producing sector and a 
construction sector. The model distinguishes between Ricardian households that have full access to financial 
markets and credit-constrained households facing collateral constraints on their borrowing. The economy is part of a 
monetary union and faces an exogenous interest rate. There is a fiscal authority, which follows rule-based 
stabilisation policies. Behavioural and technological relationships are subject to autocorrelated shocks. The model is 
estimated on Spanish data over the period 1995Q1-2011Q4 (2). 
Spain has had a persistent trade balance deficit since 1998, and its net foreign liabilities rose from 20% of GDP in 
1995 to 90% of GDP in 2011. The decomposition of net external debt into the relative contributions of different 
estimated shocks in the model suggests that one of the main factors behind the build-up of imbalances was low real 
interest rates and easier access to credit, linked to the inflow of cheap capital due to the disappearance of the risk 
premium and monetary policy being set at euro area level. Upon joining EMU, Spain saw a sharp reduction in real 
interest rates, even reaching negative territory between 2001 and 2006. According to model estimates, up to ¾ of the 
build-up in foreign debt can be attributed to the elimination of the interest rate risk premium in EMU. Looser 
monetary policy added further to the build-up, and additional smaller contributing factors were shocks to the stock 
market and to housing and the loosening of lending conditions. 
The model can also be used to project forward the correction that is required to reduce foreign indebtedness in the 
future to a more sustainable level. The model contains an (external) debt-contingent interest rate premium, which 
over the estimation period is very small, reflecting the continuous build-up in external debt without a strong 
equilibrating mechanism. As a result, in the baseline projection external liabilities continue to climb. As risk 
assessments have changed fundamentally since the financial crisis, an alternative scenario illustrates what happens 
in a more risk-averse environment where financial markets are concerned by Spain’s external indebtedness and the 
risk premium increases. By way of illustration, the risk premium is increased to a level that implies a 4.8 basis point 
increase in interest rates for a 1 pp increase in external liabilities. In the long run, this stabilises the net foreign 
liabilities to GDP ratio at 35%. To test the possible impact of structural reforms on labour markets, a second 
alternative scenario combines the same increase in risk premium with a wage moderation shock that reduces real 
wage growth by 6 pp annualised. 
                                                          
(1) For references on the QUEST model, see: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/research/macroeconomic_models_en.htm. 
(2) In ’t Veld, J., A. Pagano, R. Raciborski, M. Ratto and W. Roeger (2012), ‘Imbalances and rebalancing scenarios in an 
estimated structural model for Spain’, European Economy Economic Papers No 458.  
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the countries concerned, which was, however, 
contained by favourable developments in growth 
and implicit yields. Since the crisis, balances have 
generally improved somewhat but the effect 
should be only temporary. The accumulation of 
large external liabilities have also been associated 
with large valuation effects, especially in the case 
of Member States with very high gross asset and 
liability positions such as Ireland and Cyprus. 
With the major exception of Ireland, and to a 
smaller degree Spain, valuation effects appear, 
however, to have a large temporary component. 
Graph I.9: Simulation results (1) (2) (3) 
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(1) Baseline scenario: estimated model. 
(2) With higher risk premium: stabilising NFL to 35% of GDP. 
(3) With wage moderation: as scenario (2) plus reduction in real wage growth by 6 pp annualised. 
Source: DG ECFIN, QUEST simulation. 
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In addition to their negative effect on disposable 
income, there is empirical evidence that 
excessively high external liabilities increase the 
economy’s vulnerability to shocks and hinder its 
growth prospects. It is therefore important to 
assess the sustainability of the euro area Member 
States’ external positions.  
In recent years, euro area Member States with 
large external liabilities have gone through a clear 
current account rebalancing process. The 
rebalancing was first driven by demand 
compression, but has also been gradually 
supported by improvements in competitiveness 
and gains in export market shares. 
Notwithstanding these progresses, an assessment 
 
based on various estimates of IIP-stabilising or 
IIP-reducing current account positions and on the 
composition of balance sheets shows that some 
euro area countries with large external liabilities 
have not yet moved to a sustainable IIP trajectory. 
Given the magnitude of the adjustment needed to 
reduce external liabilities to a sustainable level in 
some Member States, a better understanding of 
adjustment processes is key. While further work is 
needed on the issue, this chapter has discussed the 
‘mechanics’ of the adjustment and proposed some 
illustrative model simulations. The analysis 
suggests that structural reforms can help to soften 
the negative short-term impact of the rebalancing 
process on growth and employment. 
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Debt reduction and fiscal multipliers 
One of the main consequences of the economic and financial crisis has been sharp increases in government 
debt. As a result, euro area Member States have engaged in sizeable fiscal consolidation programmes. In the 
face of growing signs of a weakening economy, a public debate is taking place on the effectiveness of 
consolidation, with some commentators claiming that "austerity can be self-defeating". The analysis shows that 
debt to GDP ratios may indeed initially increase in some Member States in response to fiscal consolidations. 
This would be mainly the case where fiscal multipliers are high and initial debt ratios are elevated. However, 
such an effect is in most cases short-lived. Only under very unlikely configuration can consolidation become 
truly self-defeating in the sense of a steady increase in the debt ratio. This unlikely configuration includes high 
and persistent fiscal multipliers, an abnormal impact of consolidation on government interest rate (i.e. interest 
rates rise permanently with consolidation) and a strong degree of short-sightedness in financial markets. 
Consolidation remains necessary to make debt decrease in the medium-term. In order to assure its success, the 
credibility of the adjustment is crucial in providing financial markets with a long-term view. 
Fiscal consolidation in reformed and unreformed labour markets 
A number of euro area Member States have recently put in place ambitious fiscal consolidation plans while at 
the same time carrying out major labour market reforms with a view, in particular, to reform employment 
protection legislation (EPL). Such a strategy raises the question of the potential effects of fiscal consolidation 
on employment and interactions between consolidation and labour market structure. The negative effects of 
fiscal retrenchment on jobs could a priori be expected to be mitigated in countries offering a high level of 
employment protection but the empirical analysis presented in this section does not support this claim. It 
provides evidence that fiscal consolidation is not less costly in terms of employment in countries with a high 
level of EPL because the impact of fiscal policy on job in- and outflows is different. In high-EPL countries, 
fiscal retrenchment destroys less jobs but also leads to a stronger reduction in the rate at which new jobs are 
created. A reduced job finding rate corresponds to a longer average duration of unemployment spells so that 
consolidation also tends to raise the share of long-term unemployment in high-EPL countries.  
Assessing the economic impact of financial transaction taxes 
The financial crisis has revived the debate about the role that financial transaction taxes can play in ensuring a 
contribution of the financial sector to the costs of the crisis and related rescue measures, in diminishing 
financial volatility and its economic costs and in reducing socially unproductive transactions. An increase in 
the cost of capital and the resulting negative effects on investment and economic activity are generally 
considered to be the main drawbacks of such a tax. Against this background, the last section in the chapter 
analyses the impact of a tax on secondary-market securities' transactions on financial volatility, the volatility of 
real variables and long-term levels of economic activity. The analysis uses a general equilibrium model with a 
financial sector where shifts in trader sentiment introduce non-fundamental volatility. In this setting, 
transaction taxes reduce the volatility in financial markets and, to some extent, in the real sector. The tax 
reduces the amount of resources consumed in non-fundamental trading. However, the negative impact of the 
tax on share prices also increases the costs of capital in the real sector and reduces output in the long term. 
For a given tax revenue, the output effect of the transaction tax is broadly similar to the one of corporate 
income taxation and higher those of personal income and value-added taxes. 
 
 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area 3/2012 
 
- 22 - 
II.1. Debt reduction and fiscal 
multipliers 
The deterioration of public finances in the first 
years of the crisis has led most Member States to 
adopt sizeable consolidation packages. However, 
in view of the persistence of the crisis and the 
signs of weakening economic activity a vast 
public debate has arisen on the effectiveness of 
fiscal consolidation in the current situation, 
centred on the question of whether "austerity can 
be self-defeating". In this context, "self-defeating" 
would mean that "a reduction in government 
expenditure leads to such a strong fall in activity 
that fiscal performance indicators actually get 
worse" (Gros (2011)). (29) 
Fiscal multipliers are key to assess the response of 
the public debt ratio to a fiscal consolidation. This 
section analyses the effects of fiscal 
consolidations on the public debt ratio in 
alternative scenarios for the key parameters 
affecting debt dynamics. The main factors 
affecting the debt response are the fiscal 
multipliers and the financial markets' horizon. The 
work presented here summarizes the more 
detailed analysis presented in Part III of the 
European Commission 2012 Public Finance 
Report. (30)  
The section begins with a presentation of the 
analytical framework that formalizes the debt 
dynamics following a consolidation shock and its 
relationship with fiscal multipliers. It proceeds 
with an analysis of the conditions influencing the 
number of years that, in case of a short-term 
consolidation-induced debt-increase, are needed 
for a consolidation to show its effects on the debt 
ratio. It concludes with a discussion of some 
policy implications. 
Debt dynamics and effects from consolidations 
In the absence of any stock-flow adjustments, the 
government debt to GDP ratio (b) evolves 
according to the following formula:  
                                                        
(29) See also Buti, M. and L. Pench, (2012) 'Fiscal austerity and 
policy credibility', VoxEU.org, 20 April; Cafiso, G. and R. 
Cellini (2011), 'Fiscal consolidations for debt-to-GDP ratio 
containment? Maybe… but with much care', VoxEU.org, 20 
March; Gros, D. (2011), 'Can austerity be self-defeating?', 
VoxEU.org, 29 November; Corsetti, G. and G. Müller,  
(2012), 'Has austerity gone too far?', VoxEU.org, 20 
February; Cottarelli, C. (2012), 'Fiscal Adjustment: too much 
of a good thing?' VoxEU.org, 8 February; Krugman, P. 
(2012), 'Europe’s Economic Suicide', New York Times, April 
15. 
(30) European Economy. 4 July 2012. 
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where bal represents the budget balance to GDP 
ratio, pbal the primary budget balance, r the 
average effective interest rate on government debt  
and g nominal GDP growth. The evolution of the 
debt ratio can therefore be understood as being 
driven by the primary balance and the snowball 
effect, which is the difference between the 
average effective interest rate and the growth rate 
of the economy. Over the medium-term, the 
snowball effect is of particular importance as it 
determines the magnitude of primary balances 
that are necessary in order to ensure that 
government debt remains sustainable. 
Short-run effects of fiscal consolidations 
The effect of a consolidation ("a" in the 
following) is measured by its induced change on 
debt. A positive consolidation effect is found if 
the debt ratio under consolidation is smaller than 
the debt ratio in the baseline. Arithmetically, the 
change induced on debt by consolidation is:  
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In the short-term, a consolidation affects the debt 
ratio both via its effect on the primary balance and 
via its effect on the rate of growth of GDP. In 
turn, the first of these two effects is the sum of 
two components reflecting the direct increase in 
the primary balance due to the consolidation 
measures adopted, and the indirect impact on 
growth of the primary balance via the automatic 
stabilizers (which leads to a partly offsetting 
decrease of the primary balance). (31) The second 
effect reflects the so-called "denominator effect", 
i.e. the fact that a lower level of GDP entails a 
higher debt ratio for a given level of debt.  
Overall, the short-term effect of consolidations on 
the debt level is a function of the existing debt 
level, the output multiplier of fiscal policy 
measures (i.e. the overall GDP response to the 
fiscal shock) and the cyclical budget semi-
elasticity, ε, which measures the response of the 
                                                        
(31) If m1 is the one-year output multiplier and ε is the semi-
elasticity of budget balance to growth, the precise formula, 
where m1 and ε are positive parameters, is 
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general government balance-to-GDP ratio to the 
GDP growth rate: (32) 
1)( 11 −⋅+= − mbda
db
t
t ε  
This equation leads to the conclusions that i) a 
high starting level of debt tends to dampen the 
debt-reducing impact of consolidation all else 
equal, which operates through the denominator 
effect. If the initial debt ratio is large enough, 
consolidations can even bring about increases in 
the short term. The same holds for the elasticity of 
the government balance to the cycle; and ii) the 
larger the short-term multiplier, the smaller the 
debt-reducing impact of consolidations. This 
effect is actually independent of the economic 
growth rate and of the interest rate prior to the 
fiscal consolidation.  
It is therefore possible to compute a critical value 
for the multiplier beyond which a consolidation 
leads to a negative rather than positive impact. 
This critical value is computed as: 
ε+
=
−1
1
1
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m  
It diminishes with the level of debt – the higher 
the debt the larger the growth impact on the debt 
to GDP dynamic – and with the response of the 
government balance-to-GDP ratio to  GDP growth 
– the effect of consolidation measures on deficit 
are smaller the more the automatic stabilizers 
react to diminished growth. For a debt ratio equal 
to 100% of GDP, a typical order of magnitude on 
the value of the critical multipliers can be 
computed to be 2/3 if it is assumed that the semi-
elasticity of the budget balance to growth is 1/2. 
Table II.1.1 shows the estimated critical 
multipliers for the euro-area Member States, for 
the 2011 levels of Maastricht debt and the semi-
elasticities currently employed to gauge the 
cyclical component of the budget balance. A 
review of the empirical literature indicates that in 
many cases the empirical multipliers are close to 
or even higher than the critical values presented in 
the table. In particular, for European countries 
cumulative multipliers of public expenditure after 
                                                        
(32) All the previous computations are done with respect of a 
baseline, i.e. they show the comparison between the debt 
ratio at time t after the consolidation and the debt ratio that 
would have prevailed at time t in the absence of 
consolidation.   
four quarters (one year) are usually found to be 
above unity.  Tax-based consolidations are usually 
found to entail somewhat lower multipliers than 
expenditure-based consolidations, although there 
is much variation across the different studies 
depending on the methodology to identify tax 
shocks and the country concerned. Multipliers 
derived from the European Commission's QUEST 
model amount to around 0.4 to 0.7 for the euro 
area for a balanced consolidation relying equally 
on expenditures and revenues in normal economic 
times, depending on credibility and to 0.7 to 
around 1.2 in crisis situations. 
 
Table II.1.1: Critical first year multipliers in the 
euro area at constant interest rates (2011) 
 
Source: Commission services' calculation  
 
The comparison between the critical multipliers in 
Table II.1.1 and the estimates found in the 
literature would suggest that Greece is the only 
country where short-run debt increases could be 
observed even in normal times and if 
consolidation is balanced. However, in the current 
situation more than one third of the euro area 
countries are likely to see their debt ratio 
increasing compared to the baseline in the first 
year when a consolidation process is 
implemented. This is due to several factors. First, 
the public debt has increased further relative to 
the 2011 level shown in the table. Second, fiscal 
multipliers are likely to be high at the current 
juncture for a number of reasons: consolidation is 
partly spending-based and some households and 
firms are credit constraints and the transmission of 
monetary policy is partly broken. In addition, in 
case of doubts about the credibility of the 
consolidation strategy fiscal multipliers could 
even be higher.  
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Medium-run effects of fiscal consolidations 
The medium-term evolution of the debt ratio, in 
the absence of any effect on government yields, is 
the sum of the same three effects indicated in the 
previous subsection: i) the cumulative effect of 
growth on debt, which is larger the larger the 
initial debt stock and the larger the medium-term 
multipliers; ii) The cumulative effect of growth on 
government balance via the operation of the 
automatic stabilisers on the budget balance, which 
is greater the larger the size of the multipliers and 
the size of automatic stabilisers and; iii) the 
cumulative effect from the adjustment of 
government balance, which increases with the 
number of years and with the size of the 
consolidation implemented. The first two effects 
increase the debt ratio, while the third lowers it.  
One way to look at the medium-term effects of a 
consolidation is to consider the number of years 
n* (hereafter "the critical year") necessary for the 
consolidation to lead to a decrease in debt with 
respect to a baseline scenario that keeps the 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio constant (i.e. non-
consolidation scenario). The critical period n* is 
different from the number of years required for 
the debt to go below its level before starting to 
consolidate unless the baseline corresponds to a 
scenario with a constant debt ratio. However, 
when the baseline scenario is characterized by an 
increasing debt-to-GDP ratio, the number of years 
needed to bring the ratio below the pre-
consolidation level exceeds n*. In this connection, 
it is worthwhile noticing that the size of the 
consolidation does not affect n*, whereas it is key 
to determine the number of years needed to 
reduce the debt ratio below the existing level 
before the adoption of the consolidation measures.  
The higher the multipliers in the first year and the 
larger the change in GDP induced by the 
consolidation, the larger the value of n* and the 
longer it will take for a consolidation to be 
effective in reducing the public debt ratio. The 
response of output to the fiscal consolidation, i.e. 
the fiscal multiplier, can be very persistent or can 
decay rapidly in the first years. (33) Graph II.1.1 
shows the debt-to-GDP ratio dynamics for the 
                                                        
(33) Medium term multipliers are obtained by applying a decay 
function with powers of 0.5 for the low persistence case and 
of 0.8 for the high persistence case. In the low persistence 
case around 47% of the initial effect on output vanishes at the 
2nd year and around 90% thereof at the 6th year. In the high 
persistence case only around 18% of the initial effect on 
output disappears the following year after the shock and at 
the 6th year around 3.7% of the initial effect still remains. 
low-persistence multipliers path under different 
assumptions about the impact multiplier. The 
baseline scenario is one of a constant debt ratio of 
100% of GDP and a cyclical budgetary semi-
elasticity of ε=0.55. When the first-year multiplier 
lies below 0.7 –corresponding to the value of the 
critical multiplier–, the consolidation lowers the 
debt ratio from the first year. It should be noted 
that a first year multiplier of 1.5 is on the high 
side of existing estimates as it is the estimate of a 
temporary consolidation based on government 
spending. 
Graph II.1.1: Debt dynamics with no effect on 
interest rates, low persistence  
(% of GDP, time horizon: 6 years) (1) 
 
(1) baseline steady state, b0 = 100% 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph II.1.2: Debt dynamics with no effect on 
interest rates, high persistence  
(% of GDP, time horizon: 6 years) (1) 
 
(1) baseline steady state, b0 = 100% 
Source: Commission services. 
Graph II.1.2 shows the corresponding case for a 
high persistence of the multiplier. The higher 
persistence generates longer-lasting negative 
effects from fiscal consolidation. If the first-year 
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multiplier is 1.5 the consolidation-based debt 
increase lasts for one more year so that three years 
are needed before debt goes below baseline. 
Introducing changes of government yields 
The analysis has so far been based on the 
assumption of constant interest rate. This is 
obviously a very strong assumption as 
consolidation affects solvability and thereby 
interest rates which in turn affect fiscal balances 
and the dynamics of consolidation. Over the 
medium-term, changes to the average effective 
interest rate are as important a factor for the debt 
to GDP dynamics as the growth rate of GDP. The 
impact of consolidation on average effective 
interest rates is more visible in the medium-term 
than in the short-term, with limited first-year 
impact on the debt level. 
The sign of this effect however is not clear cut as 
it depends crucially on the way market 
expectations are generated. In the simulations 
presented hereafter it is assumed that the change 
on average effective interest rates is driven by the 
risk premium so that the change of the average 
effective interest rate ri due to a consolidation a is 
expressed as: 
0=
++=
dr
hii
da
db
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dr γµ
 
where µ can be interpreted as the effect on the 
interest rate (via the risk premium) linked to the 
credibility of the consolidation measures adopted 
(34), while γ represents the yield sensitivity to the 
debt level and h refers to the horizon considered 
by the financial markets. 
The normal case would be that consolidation 
improves market confidence and reduces yields, 
leading to a lower average effective interest rate r. 
In this case, the effect of consolidation on debt is 
reinforced and debt-to-GDP ratios are likely to 
decrease at a higher speed (or increase less) than 
with constant yields. This is the case illustrated by 
Graph II.1.3 under the condition that the first-year 
multiplier is 1.5 and no reaction of interest rates to 
public debt increases (γ=0) takes place. It can be 
seen that the critical number of years before the 
debt is reduced to below its starting level declines 
somewhat with respect to the simulation where 
these confidence affects are not accounted for.  
Myopic behaviour and debt ratio 
However, under certain conditions markets might 
react to consolidations by increasing yields, 
especially when starting levels of debt are very 
high, the consolidation strategy lacks credibility, 
the expectations about future GDP growth are 
subdued or when the time horizon considered by 
financial markets is very short. In such a case, the 
increase in interest rates would entail a rise in the 
debt ratio, which would involve an increase in the 
number of years needed to resume to the starting 
                                                        
(34) A constant coefficient associated to the credibility of the 
adjustment is arguably a strong assumption, although helpful 
to illustrate its implications for debt dynamics. Another 
inconvenient of this linear specification is that it does not 
take into account thresholds effects, which can be potentially 
relevant in crisis periods. 
Graph II.1.3: Confidence effects on debt dynamics, first-year m=1.5  
(in % of GDP, time horizon: 6 years) 
 
Source: Commission services. 
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level. Such an effect would be rather unusual, 
however. In particular, where h=1 indicates that 
markets look at the debt in the year of the 
consolidation, thereby indicating a high degree of 
myopia of financial markets. In this case, if a 
consolidation increases the debt ratio due to the 
denominator effect, a high sensitivity of interest 
rates to the debt ratio could make consolidations 
self-defeating and act as a driver for a divergent 
debt ratio. 
The presence of myopia in financial markets can 
play a role in increasing the number of years after 
which the debt ratio remains above baseline. 
However, as simulations in Graph II.1.4 shows, 
only in very extreme cases characterized by high 
and persistent multipliers and elevated debt ratios, 
financial markets myopia would lead to a debt 
increase in the medium run. In these simulations a 
positive reaction of interest rates to debt increases 
(γ=0.3) has been assumed.   
Conclusions 
The reaction of debt ratios to fiscal consolidations 
is largely driven by the size of the GDP 
multiplier. In this regard, it is likely that one-year 
multipliers are larger in the current crisis period 
than in normal times. Accordingly, the currently 
high debt levels and the presumably sizeable 
fiscal multipliers due to the crisis, jointly with 
normal values for cyclical elasticities, are likely to 
lead to debt rises in response to consolidations in 
the short run in several Member States.  
However, for high but plausible values of the 
multipliers, such counter-intuitive effects are 
short-lived. Over the medium-term, 
consolidations are generally successful in 
reducing the debt-to-GDP-ratio as long as they are 
based on measures with permanent effects on the 
budget. However, debt increases following fiscal 
consolidations can be more protracted if 
multipliers are high and very persistent or if 
interest rates rise abnormally in response to a 
fiscal tightening accompanied by a short-term rise 
in debt. A credible consolidation strategy would 
significantly reduce such risks. A fully self-
defeating dynamics would only be generated 
under very unlikely configurations for which, in 
addition to very large multipliers and brisk 
increases in sovereign interest rates in response to 
the consolidation, a high degree of financial 
market myopia is required. 
The analysis presented in this section implies that, 
for a number of euro-area Member States, it will 
take some time before consolidation brings debt 
ratios back to current levels. In the current setting, 
involving high fiscal multipliers, it is likely that 
some consolidation packages will lead to 
temporary short-term debt increases that will 
lengthen the horizon over which public debt will 
start to decrease. To speed up the process of debt 
reduction in the sense of bringing debt below its 
pre-consolidation level, sizeable consolidations 
are warranted. Moreover, given the currently high 
debt levels in many of these countries, 
consolidating is of primary importance, as 
delaying the adjustment implies rising debt ratios, 
which increases significantly the likelihood of 
fully self-defeating dynamics in the future. 
 
Graph II.1.4: Debt evolution as a function of market horizon, first year m=1.5  
(in % of GDP, time horizon: 6 years) 
 
Source: Commission services. 
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II.2. Fiscal consolidation in reformed 
and unreformed labour markets 
Introduction 
Since the onset of the of the 2008 financial crisis, 
Europe has been witnessing a worrying upsurge in 
unemployment and an unprecedented dispersion 
of unemployment rates. The implementation of 
major and protracted fiscal consolidation 
strategies in such a context, and without prospects 
of a stable worldwide recovery, has stimulated a 
policy debate on the growth and employment 
impact of consolidation measures. (35)  
Despite these concerns, a number of euro area 
countries have recently put in place ambitious 
fiscal consolidation plans while at the same time 
carrying out major labour market reforms. In 
particular, the rigid and hard-to-reform 
employment protection legislation (EPL) systems 
in southern European countries have been 
profoundly shaken up with a view to stimulating 
job creation and tackling the problem of labour 
market segmentation. At the same time, severe 
budgetary cuts have been implemented in order to 
put public finances on a sustainable footing and 
reassure markets.  
Empirical analyses of the impact of fiscal policy 
focus mostly on output, (36) while only a few 
papers look at the unemployment and labour 
market impact. An example of the latter is 
Monacelli et al. (2010) (37), who develop a 
structural VAR for the US and find a negative and 
significant impact of government spending on 
unemployment and job destruction, while job 
creation increases. 
Against this background, the present section aims 
to address the following questions:  
• How do employment protection reforms 
interact with fiscal consolidation in 
determining unemployment and labour market 
flows?  
                                                        
(35) See for instance Corsetti, G. (2012), ‘Has austerity gone too 
far?’, VoxEU.org, 2 April. 
(36) Blanchard, O. and R. Perotti (2002), ‘An empirical 
characterization of the dynamic effects of changes in 
government spending and taxes on output’, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, NR. 1329-68; and Perotti, R. 
(2005), ‘Estimating the effects of fiscal policy in OECD 
countries’, Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco. 
(37) Monacelli, T, R. Perotti, and A. Trigari (2010), 
‘Unemployment fiscal multipliers’, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 97(5), 531-553 
• What is the impact of fiscal consolidation on 
job market flows, and does it matter if 
dismissals are less costly?  
The section looks at the impact of fiscal policy on 
cyclical unemployment, job market flows and the 
share of long-term unemployment. Cyclical 
unemployment is defined as the difference 
between the actual unemployment rate and the 
non-accelerating-wage rate of unemployment 
(NAWRU). The analysis is based on a recent 
panel regression presented in more detail in 
Turrini (2012). (38)  
Measuring fiscal consolidation and assessing 
the link between consolidation and 
unemployment  
While much of the available empirical research on 
the impact of fiscal consolidation uses estimates 
of the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
(CAPB) as a measure of discretionary changes in 
fiscal policy, the present work rests on an ‘action-
based’ database recently developed at the 
IMF. (39) Using an ‘action-based’ measure of 
fiscal adjustment (i.e. as announced by fiscal 
authorities) removes some of the estimation biases 
traditionally associated with the CAPB. These 
include difficulties in measuring the cycle in real 
time and endogeneity issues due to the fact that 
the discretionary component of fiscal policy may 
respond to changes in cyclical conditions. With an 
action-based measure of consolidation, causality 
is measured one way – from fiscal policy to 
unemployment.  
Graph II.3.1 displays prima-facie evidence of the 
link between cyclical unemployment and fiscal 
consolidation. The scatterplot exhibits a positive, 
though weak, relation between consolidation and 
cyclical unemployment across the panel. Of 
course, this prima-facie evidence does not imply 
causation but is suggestive of a possible link 
running from fiscal policy to unemployment 
outcomes. 
The link can be further investigated by means of a 
set of panel regressions that relate labour market 
conditions to fiscal consolidation. In the baseline 
regression specification, cyclical unemployment 
                                                        
(38) Turrini, A. (2012), ‘Fiscal consolidation in reformed and 
unreformed labour markets: A close look at EU countries’, 
European Economy, Economic Papers, European Economic 
Paper no. 462. 
(39) Devries, P., Guajardo J., Leigh D., and A. Pescatori (2011), 
‘A new action-based dataset of fiscal consolidation’, IMF 
Working Paper WP/11/128. 
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in thirteen EU Member States (ten of which are 
euro-area countries) between 1980 and 2010 is 
regressed on the measure of fiscal consolidation 
(see BoxII.2.1 for more details on the data and the 
methodology as well as a table of results). The 
underlying assumption is that fiscal consolidation 
mostly impacts cyclical unemployment. 
 
Graph II.2.1: Cyclical unemployment and fiscal 
consolidations, action-based (1980-2009), 
13 EU countries 
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Regression results show that there is a high degree 
of persistence in cyclical unemployment. The 
short-term unemployment impact multiplier of the 
overall budgetary consolidation variable is 
positive but not large, amounting to less than 1/10 
of a percentage point of unemployment for each 
GDP point of consolidation. The result seems to 
be mostly attributable to consolidation efforts on 
the spending side. A breakdown of the 
consolidations into revenue and spending shows 
that, while the impact of government revenue is 
not statistically significant, that of government 
expenditure is negative and higher in absolute 
value and of a higher order of significance than 
that for the overall budget balance. The result is in 
line with the empirical literature, which generally 
points to higher short-term multipliers for 
spending-based consolidation than for tax-based 
consolidation. 
The estimated unemployment impact multipliers 
are broadly in line with existing estimates of GDP 
fiscal multipliers. For instance, the estimated 
coefficient for government expenditure (0.16) 
would imply a GDP fiscal multiplier of about 
0.50, assuming a standard Okun coefficient of 
0.3. (40)  
Separate regression results for high and low EPL 
countries can contribute to the assessment of the 
interplay between the unemployment effects of 
fiscal policy and the role of labour market 
regulation. Focusing on the expenditure side of 
consolidation, fiscal consolidations are found to 
have a somehow larger effect on unemployment 
in regulated labour markets. High EPL countries 
show an unemployment impact that is around ten 
basis points higher for each GDP point of 
expenditure-based consolidation than the low 
protection countries. Probably due to the 
reduction in sample size, all other estimated fiscal 
policy effects in an EPL-based split of the sample 
countries are not statistically significant.  
The result that fiscal consolidation is not less 
harmful in more regulated labour markets runs 
counter to intuition, as a high level of employment 
protection could be expected to cushion the short-
term impact of consolidation on employment. The 
explanation could lie in the different behaviour of 
job creation and job destruction. It is well-known 
from existing theory and empirical evidence that 
strict EPL is associated with lower exit rates to 
unemployment but also with a lower probability 
for the unemployed to find new jobs and therefore 
higher risks of long-term unemployment. (41) It 
could be the case that in high-EPL countries fiscal 
policy shocks destroy fewer jobs but also lead to a 
stronger reduction in the rate at which new jobs 
are created, with a possibly overall stronger effect 
on cyclical unemployment.  
The estimation of the impact of fiscal 
consolidation on job market flows separately for 
high- and low-EPL countries supports the above 
hypothesis. Job separation rates are found to rise 
significantly with fiscal retrenchments only in 
low-EPL countries. Conversely, job finding rates 
appear to react mostly in high-EPL countries. (42)  
                                                        
(40) The Okun law relates changes in unemployment to changes 
in GDP.   
(41) Mortensen D. and C. Pissarides (1994), ‘Job Creation and job 
destruction in the theory of unemployment’, The Review of 
Economic Studies, vol. 61(3), pp. 397-415 and Gomez-
Salvador R., J. Messina and G. Vallanti (2004), ‘Gross job 
flows and institutions in Europe’, Labour Economics, vol. 11, 
pp. 469-485. 
(42) Data on job separation and job finding rates are hazard rates 
(i.e. individual probabilities of changing labour market 
status). See Box II.2.1 for further details. 
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Box II.2.1: Data and methodology
Data 
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 13 EU countries, including 10 euro-area Member States (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) and 3 non-euro EU members 
(Denmark, Sweden and the UK). Lack of data for some countries and variables restricts the sample.  
The baseline measure of fiscal consolidation is the ‘action-based’ variable constructed by Devries et al. (2011). Data 
on this variable have been collected over the period 1978-2009 and are available for seventeen OECD Member 
States, including the 13 EU countries mentioned above. This action-based consolidation variable contains bottom-up 
estimates of the amounts of measures taken by the government during years when the overall objective of fiscal 
policy, as reported in official statements and documents, was to reduce the deficit and improve the state of public 
finances. If, in a given year and in a given country, fiscal policy resulted in a deliberate reduction in the budget 
deficit, the variable reports the estimated amount of discretionary measures, otherwise the variable is set to zero. 
These ‘action-based’ measures have a double advantage: they are not affected by the economic cycle because their 
construction follows a bottom-up approach and they are unlikely to suffer from reverse causation since fiscal 
adjustment episodes driven by the objective of stabilising output are excluded.  
The baseline dependent variable is cyclical unemployment. It is obtained from the difference between the overall 
unemployment rate and the non-accelerating-wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU). NAWRU is the level of 
unemployment below which the wage rate would rise. The data on NAWRU come from the European Commission’s 
AMECO database. Cyclical rather than ordinary unemployment is used as a dependent variable in order to reduce the 
risk of non-stationarity in the panel. The complicated estimation of a cointegrated panel regression is thus avoided.  
Other regressions model the dependent variable as the job separation rate or the job finding rate. Data on job 
separation and job finding rates (hazard rates) are constructed as described in Arpaia and Curci (2010), following the 
methodology proposed by Shimer (2007). Data on job flows are available for all EU countries but for shorter time 
series compared to cyclical unemployment (going back to 1997 at the earliest). Data on the share of long-term 
unemployment in overall unemployment are taken from Eurostat and are available for all EU countries starting from 
1992 at the earliest.  
 
Empirical strategy 
The baseline regression framework used in the analysis of cyclical unemployment is: 
titititititi FCuuu ,,2,1,, εηθγβα +++++= −−     (1) 
where i, t denote country and year, respectively, u is cyclical unemployment, FC is a consolidation variable, θ and η 
are country and year fixed effects, respectively, and ε is a standard white-noise error. This specification amounts to an 
augmented AR2 model, which is motivated by the broadly regular oscillations of cyclical unemployment around the 
mean (zero) over large samples.  
The modelling of the impact of fiscal policy on other labour market variables is analogous to (1) except that, for job 
market flows (hazard rates) and the share of long-term unemployment, the second autoregressive term is dropped 
(being largely insignificant). Equation (1) is estimated by means of panel-fixed effect estimation (least square dummy 
variables) with robust standard errors for the case of action-based consolidation measures. With a view to shedding 
light on the interaction between fiscal policy and labour market regulation, regressions are run separately for high and 
low EPL countries. The breakdown of countries follows a straightforward criterion: countries with high (low) EPL 
are assumed to be those with an average value over the sample period of the OECD’s overall EPL indicator above 
(below) the median of such averages for all EU countries.  
 
References: 
Arpaia, A., and N. Curci (2010), ‘EU labour market behaviours during the Great Recession’, European Economy 
Economic Papers no. 405. 
Devries, P., Guajardo J., Leigh D., and A. Pescatori (2011), ‘A new action-based dataset of fiscal consolidation’, IMF 
Working Paper WP/11/128 
Shimer, D. (2007), ‘Reassessing the ins and outs of unemployment’, NBER Working Paper No. 13421.  
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The fact that job market flows react differently to 
fiscal consolidation according to the EPL regime 
helps in assessing the impact of fiscal 
retrenchment on the share of long-term 
unemployment. Since a reduced job finding rate 
corresponds to a longer average duration of 
unemployment spells, one would expect that fiscal 
policy shocks also tend to raise the share of long-
term unemployment in high-EPL countries. The 
regression results support this expectation. 
Concluding remarks 
This section has shown that fiscal consolidation is 
not necessarily less harmful in terms of 
unemployment in regulated labour markets. It also 
shows that there are well-grounded reasons to 
expect it to be more worrying in terms of 
unemployment composition, as high EPL is 
associated with a stronger reduction in job 
creation and a higher incidence of long-term 
unemployment. 
Box (continued) 
 
Main results 
Dependent variable: 
Revenue, 
action 
based
Expenditure, 
action based
Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL
Explanatory variables:
Cyclical unemployment (1 lag) 1.22 1.194 1.19 1.198
[18.09]** [17.57]** [19.39]** [14.27]**
Cyclical unemployment (2 lags) -0.611 -0.607 -0.619 -0.603
[7.46]** [7.56]** [10.37]** [7.24]**
Job separation rate (1 lag) 0.233 0.825 0.268 0.827 0.262 0.825
[1.07] [6.65]** [1.28] [6.66]** [1.20] [6.81]**
Fiscal policy variable 0.018 -0.16 -0.148 -0.273 0.065 -0.027 0.12 -0.023 -0.105 0.088
[0.20] [2.35]* [2.34]* [2.31]* [3.75]** [0.48] [3.82]** [0.27] [3.17]** [0.80]
Constant -0.236 0.303 0.427 -0.276 0.641 0.058 0.62 0.059 0.618 0.057
[2.30]* [1.58] [2.17]* [1.08] [3.97]** [0.65] [3.96]** [0.64] [3.78]** [0.65]
Observations 353 353 196 157 63 52 63 52 63 52
Number of countries 13 13 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6
R squared 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.61 0.83 0.6 0.83 0.59 0.83
Dependent variable: 
Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL Low EPL High EPL
Explanatory variables:
Job finding rate (1 lag) 0.837 0.659 0.841 0.671 0.835 0.655
[4.61]** [4.34]** [4.69]** [4.36]** [4.61]** [4.40]**
Long-term unemployment share (1 lag) 0.758 0.789 0.779 0.811 0.746 0.78
[12.08]** [13.94]** [13.28]** [14.56]** [11.47]** [13.46]**
Fiscal policy variable -0.146 -1.663 -0.173 -1.761 0.338 4.292 -0.512 1.422 -0.528 1.249 1.098 -2.262
[0.67] [1.96]+ [0.44] [1.52] [0.82] [2.26]* [1.14] [1.80]+ [0.69] [1.01] [1.35] [1.81]+
Constant 0.189 3.315 0.088 3.285 0.231 3.73 8.839 6.978 3.59 12.345 9.189 7.451
[0.07] [2.45]* [0.03] [2.36]* [0.09] [1.35] [4.23]** [2.28]* [1.78]+ [4.30]** [4.29]** [2.38]*
Observations 63 52 63 52 63 52 110 96 110 96 110 96
Number of countries 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 6
R squared 0.58 0.68 0.58 0.67 0.58 0.68 0.89 0.86 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.86
Cyclical unemployment
[1.65]+
0.86
13
353
[1.58]
0.307
Revenue, action based
Expenditure, action 
based
Budget balance, action 
based
1.206
[17.87]**
-0.609
[7.50]**
0.08
Budget balance, action 
based Revenue, action based
Job separation rate
Job finding rate Long-term unemployment share
Expenditure, action 
based
Budget balance, action 
based Revenue, action based
Expenditure, action 
based
Expenditure, action 
based
Budget balance, action 
based
+, *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 1 per cent level, respectively. T-tests are reported in square brackets. 
Specification: all regressions include country and year fixed effects. 
Estimation method: fixed-effect panel OLS, standard errors robust with respect to heteroscedasticity and non-independence within 
country clusters. 
Legend: 
Budget balance, action-based: year-on-year change in government budget balance associated with fiscal consolidation measures 
(source: Devries et al., 2011). 
Revenue, action-based: year-on-year change in government revenues associated with fiscal consolidation measures on the revenue 
side (source: Devries et al., 2011). 
Expenditure, action-based: year-on-year change in government expenditure associated with fiscal consolidation measures on the 
expenditure side (source: Devries et al., 2011). 
The grouping of countries with respect to the OECD’s overall EPL indicator is based on the median country-specific average value 
of the indicator over the sample period. 
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II.3. Assessing the economic impact of 
financial transaction taxes 
The banking and financial crisis of recent years 
has led to a broad debate on financial regulation to 
improve the resilience of the financial sector and 
reduce the likelihood of further crises. Given the 
costs that rescuing financial institutions has 
inflicted on taxpayers, the call for a contribution 
from the financial sector to the financing of crisis-
intervention costs has also gained political voice 
and support. 
The European Commission issued in September 
2011 a proposal for an EU-wide financial 
transaction tax. The aim of the proposal is to 
ensure that financial institutions make a fair 
contribution to the costs of the recent crisis, to 
create disincentives for socially unproductive 
transactions, and to avoid fragmentation of the 
internal market by uncoordinated measures at 
national level. (43) 
A number of Member States have expressed their 
interest for such a tax. Eleven of them have 
submitted a request to the Commission (or are 
about to so) for a proposal to introduce a financial 
transaction tax via enhanced cooperation. 
The Commission proposes levying the tax on a 
broad set of secondary-market transactions 
(shares, bonds, derivatives), but excludes 
refinancing operations with central banks, most 
day-to-day transactions of private households and 
businesses (insurance contracts, mortgage 
lending, consumer credit, payment services) and 
currency transactions. The purpose of a broad tax 
base is to prevent potential tax evasion via the 
creation of alternative instruments as well as to 
contain negative liquidity effects in certain parts 
of the market. A broad tax base also allows 
raising substantial revenue at low tax rates. 
There is little public finance literature on the 
regulatory merits and the revenue potential of 
financial sector taxation to date, (44) but the policy 
debate has also renewed academic interest in this 
                                                        
(43) European Commission (2011), ‘Proposal for a Council 
Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax 
and amending Directive 2008/7/EC’, COM(2011) 594. 
Several Member States (e.g. Belgium, Italy, UK) already 
have transaction taxes on certain types of financial 
operations. See Brondolo, J. (2011), ‘Taxing financial 
transactions: an assessment of administrative feasibility’, 
IMF Working Paper, No 11/185 and Matheson (2011), op. 
cit.. 
(44) Keen, M. (2011), ‘Rethinking the taxation of the financial 
sector’, CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 57, No 1, pp. 1-24. 
field. Like the Commission proposal, empirical 
and theoretical research frames the debate along 
two main dimensions, namely the regulatory 
merits of transaction taxes and potential side-
effects on capital costs, investment and output. 
Transaction taxes and market volatility 
The transaction tax would be beneficial from the 
regulatory perspective if it reduced volatility in 
the financial and real sector of the economy, to 
the extent that such volatility reflects non-
fundamental ("noise") trading rather than an 
efficient adjustment to changes in economic 
fundamentals. (45) 
By lowering market liquidity, the tax may 
however also amplify the impact of individual 
(fundamental and non-fundamental) transactions 
on market prices. Whether a transaction tax 
reduces volatility in financial markets is 
ultimately an empirical question. The existing 
empirical studies on transaction taxes and market 
volatility are unfortunately non-conclusive, with 
several studies (but not all of them) concluding 
that transaction taxes may increase asset price 
volatility by reducing trading volume in financial 
markets. (46) Furthermore, reducing transaction 
volumes in financial markets does not necessarily 
reduce efficiency from the perspective of market 
volatility if only "excess liquidity" is reduced and 
transaction volumes do not go below the level 
where individual transactions can impact on asset 
prices.  (47) 
Reducing the number and volume of financial 
market transactions can, however, also improve 
economic efficiency by lowering the amount of 
resources devoted to socially non-productive, 
zero-sum transactions. (48) To the extent that 
                                                        
(45) On the concept of noise trading see e.g. Shleifer, A. and L. 
Summers (1990), ‘The noise trader approach to finance’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4, No 2, pp. 19-33. 
(46) Baltagi, B., D. Li and Q. Li (2006), ‘Transaction tax and 
stock market behaviour: evidence from an emerging market’, 
Empirical Economics, Vol. 31, No 2, pp. 393-408; Hau, H. 
(2006), ‘The role of transaction costs for financial volatility: 
evidence from the Paris bourse’, Journal of the European 
Economic Association, Vol. 4, No 4, pp. 862-890; Jones, C. 
and P. Seguin (1997), ‘Transaction costs and price volatility: 
evidence from commission deregulation’, American 
Economic Review, Vol. 87, No 4, pp. 728-737. 
(47) The existing empirical studies focus on transaction costs or 
taxes that apply to sub-segments of the financial markets. 
Broad application of a transaction tax narrows the scope for 
tax avoidance and may consequently reduce the negative 
impact of the tax on market liquidity and the related increase 
in asset price volatility. 
(48) Stiglitz, J. (1989): ‘Using tax policy to curb speculative short-
term trading’, Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol. 
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reducing socially wasteful financial transactions 
frees resources for more productive use in other 
sectors, it improves average welfare. 
Potential side-effects of transaction taxes 
The second fundamental issue in the policy and 
academic debate is the tax incidence (i.e. where 
will the tax burden finally be shifted) and its 
potential implications for capital costs, real 
investment, employment and output in the long 
term. 
A transaction tax that reduces the after-tax return 
on investment tends to reduce the amount of 
profitable physical investment. More directly, 
falling asset prices through primary-market 
taxation increase the cost of capital to be raised by 
new issuance of debt and equity. However, even if 
the tax excludes primary markets, secondary-
market taxation may still significantly increase the 
costs of capital. Investors in debt or equity may 
e.g. require a higher risk premium on new 
issuance if lower liquidity in the secondary market 
makes liquidating asset positions in the future and 
insuring against investment risks more difficult or 
expensive. A tax on the secondary market may 
also reduce real investment if firms are credit-
constrained, so that the decline in asset prices 
reduces the available collateral for investment 
loans. 
Empirical studies on the impact of financial 
transaction costs or taxes on share prices support 
the negative link between taxation and equity 
prices that the various theoretical arguments 
suggest. (49) These studies do not, however, assess 
the propagation to investment and economic 
activity in the long term. Addressing these long-
term effects is the specific advantage of a general-
equilibrium perspective. 
                                                                                  
3, No 2-3, pp.101-115; Summers, L. and V. Summers (1989), 
‘When financial markets work too well: a cautious case for a 
securities transaction tax’, Journal of Financial Services 
Research, Vol. 3, No 2-3, pp. 261-286. 
(49) Bond, S., M. Hawkins and A. Klemm (2005), ‘Stamp duty on 
shares and its effect on share prices’, FinanzArchiv, Vol. 61, 
No 3, pp. 275-297; Hu, S.-Y. (1998), ‘The effects of the stock 
transaction tax on the stock market — Experiences from 
Asian markets’, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 6, No 3-
4, pp. 347-364; Jackson, P. and A. O’Donnell (1985), ‘The 
effects of stamp duty on equity transactions and prices in the 
UK stock exchange’, Bank of England Discussion Paper, No 
25; Umlauf, S. (1993), ‘Transaction taxes and the behaviour 
of the Swedish stock market’, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 33, No 2, pp. 227-240; Westerholm, J. 
(2003), ‘The impact of transaction costs on turnover and asset 
prices: the case of Sweden’s and Finland’s security 
transaction tax reduction’, Finnish Journal of Business 
Economics, Vol. 2, No 3, pp. 213-241. 
Depending on how distortive the transaction tax is 
relative to other taxes, such as capital or labour 
income taxes, the assessment of long-term effects 
might turn more favourable in relative terms to 
the extent that raising transaction taxes would 
allow other distortionary taxes to be reduced at 
the same time. A broad tax base seems warranted 
in order to reduce the scope for tax avoidance, 
although levying a small tax on a broad base 
(especially if going beyond secondary spot 
markets) rather than a higher tax on a smaller base 
to generate a certain flow of tax revenue does not 
necessarily minimise the economic distortions 
involved. (50) 
Transaction taxes in a general-equilibrium 
model 
While empirical research and partial-equilibrium 
models have so far analysed the impact of 
transaction taxes on (a) financial market volatility 
and (b) long-term financing costs separately, the 
general-equilibrium approach can address the two 
dimensions within a single framework and links 
financial market dynamics to real sector volatility 
as well as long-term levels of investment and 
output. 
The assessment of the potential macroeconomic 
impact of introducing a transaction tax on 
secondary market trade in securities (STT) 
presented hereafter is based on a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. (51) 
In contrast with standard DSGE models that 
assume perfect financial markets, the model used 
incorporates an explicit specification of a 
financial intermediary sector characterised by 
market imperfections. The financial frictions 
considered allow for the discussion of linkages 
                                                        
(50) An illustration of the fact that a low tax rate on a broad tax 
base is not necessarily less distortive than a higher tax rate on 
a narrower base is the cascading effect of transaction taxes in 
business-to-business transactions. If the tax was also levied 
on financial transactions between firms, e.g. payment flows, 
the tax burden on the final product would increase with the 
number of intermediate transactions. This cascading effect 
would provide an incentive for vertical integration in product 
markets, with a tendency to reduce competition at the level of 
intermediate suppliers and final goods producers and increase 
production costs and final goods prices. Against this 
background of cascading effects the Commission proposal for 
the financial transaction tax excludes business-to-business 
transactions from taxation, i.e. it does not penalise transaction 
between independent entities (e.g. between external suppliers 
and producers) in the production process compared to 
transactions within integrated corporations. 
(51) For a detailed description of the overall model see Lendvai J., 
R. Raciborski and L. Vogel (2012), ‘Securities transaction 
taxes: Macroeconomic implications in a general-equilibrium 
Model’, European Economy, Economic Paper, No 450. 
II. Special topics on the euro area economy 
 
- 33 - 
between trade in secondary financial markets and 
economic activity in the non-financial sector. 
Non-fundamentals-driven financial trade is also 
discussed: it may lead to inefficient use of 
resources and excess volatility in the non-
financial sector. (52) 
In the model, the introduction of the STT affects 
volatility in both the financial and non-financial 
sectors. The tax increases the cost of trading 
activities, which reduces expected returns and 
therefore crowds out some trade in financial 
markets. To the extent that it reduces non-
fundamentals-driven trade, the STT reduces 
economic inefficiencies associated with excess 
volatility in the non-financial sector and resource 
use in non-fundamental financial transactions. 
Beyond the impact on financial and real economic 
volatility, the STT is likely to affect the corporate 
sector, and hence the whole economy, in the 
longer term by increasing the cost of raising new 
capital for investment. This effect is present in 
spite of the fact that the tax is imposed only on 
secondary market transactions. Prices of newly 
issued shares are reduced by lower demand for 
shares due to the higher overall cost of 
transactions for the trading parties. This limits the 
amount of new capital firms are able to tap on the 
market and, in the long run, leads to a fall in 
corporate investment and a lower level of GDP. 
Main simulation results 
The model is calibrated to approximately match 
the empirical shares of demand components in 
GDP as well as certain characteristics of euro-area 
financial markets. 
The results discussed show the impact of an STT 
rate that would raise additional revenue of 0.16 % 
of GDP. The figure corresponds to the midrange 
of historical tax revenues raised with transaction 
taxes in G-20 economies. (53) 
Introducing the STT reduces volatility in the 
financial and non-financial sectors (Table II.3.1, 
first column) in line with the argument that 
transaction taxes would decrease the excess 
                                                        
(52) Non-fundamental transactions in the model are based on the 
noise trader approach, where some of the traders are subject 
to changing sentiments about future asset returns. Noise 
trading leads to non-fundamental volatility in asset demand 
and asset prices. On noise trading see e.g. Shleifer, A., and L. 
Summers (1990), ‘The noise trader approach to finance’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4, No 2, pp. 19-33.  
(53) See Matheson, T. (2011), op. cit. 
volatility caused by high-frequency non-
fundamental trading. The decline in volatility is 
especially marked for financial variables, namely 
trading volumes and asset returns. The volatility 
of real variables is much less affected. (54) 
The STT also affects the long-run levels of 
financial variables (see Table II.3.1). Trading 
volumes and share prices fall by 13 % each in 
response to an STT rate raising revenues by 
0.16 % of GDP. Pre-tax returns on shares have to 
increase by 2 pp to compensate financial investors 
for the tax payment. As the decline in financial 
activity reduces the average use of resources in 
non-fundamental transactions by 0.1 percentage 
point of GDP, the tax also has a positive 
efficiency effect. 
 
Table II.3.1: Impact of an STT to raise 0.16 % of 
GDP (1) 
std/mean (pp) mean level (%)
output 0.0 -0.3
capital 0.0 -0.7
investment -0.1 -0.6
consumption -0.1 -0.1
employment -0.2 -0.1
wage 0.0 -0.2
trade -32.6 -12.8
share price -0.1 -12.8
std/mean (pp) mean level (pp)
return on share -13.1 2.0
risk-free return -42.5 0.0
return on capital -0.1 0.1
transactions costs/GDP -0.1 -0.1  
(1) The table reports the impact of a securities transaction tax 
raising revenues by 0.16 % of GDP. The first column reports the 
percentage-point (pp) change in the standard deviation of each 
variable normalised by its mean. The second column gives the 
percentage (%) change in the long-run mean level of aggregates 
and prices and percentage-point (pp) changes in the long-run 
mean of (annualised) returns, and the resource costs of trading to 
GDP. 
Source: Commission services 
 
Everything else being equal, the impact on asset 
prices and capital costs does, however, also affect 
real variables in an economy with financial 
constraints, with negative side-effects for real 
activity. In the example in Table II.3.1, the tax 
decreases the output level by about 0.3 % in the 
long run. Long-term levels of capital and 
corporate investment decline by about 0.6 %, 
while employment and wages are less strongly 
                                                        
(54) The smaller impact on the volatility of real variables is partly 
due to the fact that fluctuations in real variables are also 
driven by productivity shocks in the model. The STT on 
secondary market transactions as implemented in the model 
has no impact on such fundamental-driven volatility. 
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affected. Finally, the introduction of the STT 
appears to have little impact on consumption. (55) 
Table II.3.2 compares the effects of different 
sources of government revenue by comparing the 
output losses from increasing the Value-Added 
Tax (VAT), Personal Income Tax (PIT) and 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) rates to raise the 
same additional tax revenue of 0.16 pp of GDP. 
The result of this exercise illustrates the standard 
ranking of different taxes according to the 
distortions they create. VAT is not very distortive; 
additional VAT revenue of 0.16 pp of GDP would 
reduce long-run output by only 0.02 %. An 
increase in PIT has a similar, albeit somewhat 
larger, negative effect (a 0.1 % GDP drop). 
Among the ‘traditional’ taxes, CIT is the most 
distortive, with a long-run fall in the output level 
of circa 0.3 %. The simulations suggest distortive 
effects of the STT on real variables similar to 
those of corporate income taxation, with a similar 
long-run GDP effect of around -0.3 %. This 
implies that using STT revenues to reduce VAT 
or PIT would have a negative impact on economic 
activity while using it to reduce CIT would be 
more or less neutral. 
 
Table II.3.2: Comparison of different fiscal 
measures (1)(2) 
tax/measure effect on GDP level (%)
VAT -0.02
Personal Income Tax -0.1
Corporate Income Tax -0.3
STT -0.3
Government Investment (increase)
         output elasticity( 2 )  = 0.09 0.4
         output elasticity( 2 )  = 0.05 0.2  
(1) Impact of fiscal measures increasing government revenue by 
0.16 pp of GDP. 
(2) Output elasticity with respect to government investment. 
Source: Commission services 
 
Instead of a comparison with other taxes that 
might be reduced to offset the revenue effect of 
introducing an STT, one can also consider the 
aggregate effect if the STT revenue were devoted 
to increasing government investment expenditures 
(results in the second part of Table II.3.2). As can 
be seen, the output effect of higher government 
investment depends on the assumed degree to 
which government investment improves private 
productivity: specifically, the elasticity of output 
                                                        
(55) This last result seems, however, to depend quite strongly on 
the modelling assumptions. In other versions of the model it 
has been found that consumption could fall by up to 0.3 % in 
the long run. 
with respect to government investment. (56) 
Assuming an optimistic value (0.09) of this 
elasticity, the GDP effect of higher government 
investment is 0.4 % of GDP. When the elasticity is 
reduced to half (0.05), the impact is reduced to 
0.2 % of GDP. The findings suggest that using 
STT revenues to increase productive government 
spending, the policy could result in a net GDP 
increase only under fairly optimistic assumptions 
about the productivity of government investment. 
However, even in this case, raising revenues for 
public investment with the consumption or 
income taxes considered would lead to larger 
gains. 
 
 
Conclusions 
The simulation results with the general-
equilibrium model developed to study the effects 
of introducing an STT point to non-negligible 
effects of a securities transaction tax on the 
economy. 
The securities transaction tax reduces financial 
trading and dampens volatility, especially of 
financial sector variables. Volatility in the real 
sector is less affected by the transaction tax, partly 
due to the fact that real volatility is also driven by 
fundamental shocks that are not dampened by the 
tax on secondary market transactions. 
Introduction of the tax also brings some efficiency 
gain as the amount of resources devoted to non-
fundamental financial transactions in the economy 
declines. However, the size of the efficiency gain 
in the STT is rather limited for the low tax rates 
envisaged.  
In an economy with financing constraints for real 
investors, the STT does, on the other hand, also 
have negative side-effects for financing costs, 
productive capital and output in the long run. In 
the example of the tax on secondary spot market 
securities transactions that would generate around 
0.16 % of GDP in revenue, long-term GDP could 
decline by about 0.3 %. This long-term impact 
                                                        
(56) There is a wide range of uncertainty around these parameter 
estimates. Acknowledging the lack of consensus on the 
productivity of government investment, Leeper, E., T. 
Walker and S.-Ch. Yang (2010), ‘Government investment 
and fiscal stimulus’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Vol. 57, No 8, pp. 1000-1012, take 0.05 as a benchmark 
value. The table also reports the effects with the elasticity 
estimate of 0.09 reported by De la Fuente, A. (2010), 
‘Testing, not modelling, the impact of cohesion support: a 
theoretical framework and some preliminary results for the 
Spanish regions’, CESifo Working Paper, No 2918. This 
should be considered the upper bound. 
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makes the distortive effects of the tax similar to 
those of corporate income taxation, which are 
above those of personal income and value-added 
taxes. 
Overall, these results suggest that the Commission 
proposal may succeed in making the financial 
sector contribute to the costs of the recent crisis as 
well as to create disincentives for socially 
unproductive transactions. Also, these results are 
likely to be achieved more effectively if the 
introduction of the financial transaction tax is co-
ordinated among EU Member States. At the same 
time, the results indicate that achieving these 
objectives comes at the cost of a negative impact 
on economic activity. Recent IMF studies reach 
similar conclusions while also mentioning that 
alternative taxes, such as a financial activity tax or 
a bank levy e.g., might be more effective tools to 
achieve the stated goals. (57)  
When using the results of the model to inform the 
policy debate, the limitations of the model 
structure should be kept in mind. The tax that is 
considered in the model does not apply to trade in  
                                                        
(57) IMF (2010), ‘A fair and substantial contribution by the 
financial sector: final report for the G-20’, IMF, Washington, 
D.C.; Matheson, T. (2011), ‘Taxing financial transactions: 
issues and evidence’, IMF Working Paper, No 11/54. 
derivatives, which accounts for a large share of 
overall financial trade in securities and, hence, 
even if taxed at a very low rate, could generate a 
higher amount of tax revenues. Moreover, the 
model looks at a closed economy with a simple 
financial structure, which excludes a discussion of 
relocation effects (when entities are moved abroad 
to avoid the application of the tax) and 
substitution effects (when entities change their 
portfolio structure to minimise the burden of the 
tax). In practice, broad application of the tax with 
respect to the geographical scope and the 
segments of the financial market covered would 
help to minimise such relocation and substitution 
effects. Finally, the effects of an STT on public 
finances critically hinge on the technical design of 
the tax, e.g. the application of the source or the 
residence principle for taxation. Some of these 
issues could in principle be addressed in a more 
complex multi-country general-equilibrium 
framework. The results that have been presented 
in this section are from a tractable model that 
avoids such complexity in favour of a better 
understanding of main transmission channels. 
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